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HARD CASES MAKING BAD LAW: THE NEED
FOR REVISION OF THE INDIAN CHILD
WELFARE ACT
Christine Metteer"

I. INTRODUCTION

In 1978 Congress enacted the Indian Child Welfare Act'
("ICWA" or "the Act") in response to the "rising concern in
the mid-1970s over the consequences to Indian children, Indian families, and Indian tribes of abusive child welfare practices that resulted in the separation of large numbers of Indian children from their families and tribes through adoption
or foster care placement, usually in non-Indian homes."2
However, state courts have continually disagreed about the
Act's requirements and when it should be applied.!
A decade after the ICWA had been enacted, but before
the United States Supreme Court had heard a case applying
the Act, a commentator noted that the various state court decisions suggested that the Act's dual goals of tribal survival
and the welfare of Indian children' were not harmonious.'
The commentator ended with the hope that "in the next ten
years, we will come closer to resolving the inconsistencies

* Professor of Legal Writing at Southwestern University School of Law.
B.A. (1973), M.A. (1975), Ph.D. (1978), University of California, Los Angeles.
The author wishes to thank Southwestern University School of Law for a research stipend. She also wishes to thank Ms. Carol Abernathy for her assistance in researching the conflicting applications of the Indian Child Welfare
Act and their consequences.
1. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1994).
2. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 32
(1989).
3. See discussion infra Part III.
4. See 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (1994); see also, Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 37 (quoting
H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, at 23 (1978) [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT]) (stating that
the Act provides for tribal preservation by protecting "the rights of the Indian
child as an Indian and the rights of the Indian community and tribe in retaining its children in its society").
5. See Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Beyond the Best Interests of the Tribe: The
Indian Child Welfare Act and the Adoption of Indian Children, 66 U. DET. L.
REV. 451, 501 (1989).
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among the Act's laudable intentions."'
Since then, the United States Supreme Court has only
once addressed the application of the ICWA, in Mississippi
Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield.7 The Holyfield court
broadly defined the term "domicile" in the Act8 to allow the
tribe jurisdiction.9 The court reasoned that as a federal act,
the ICWA's terms must be "uniform[ly]" defined and applied. ° Therefore, most analysts of the Act agree that "[i]f
Holyfield stands for anything, it is that states cannot create
their own definitions for the ICWA.""
Yet state courts continue to create their own definitions
for several key terms of the ICWA, such as: "good cause" not
to transfer jurisdiction to the tribe,' and "good cause" not to
follow the Act's placement preferences." Additionally, some
state courts have created judicial exceptions to the Act; most
notably, the "existing Indian family" exception'4 which re6. Id.
7. 490 U.S. 30 (1989).
8. See 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (1994) ("An Indian tribe shall have jurisdiction
exclusive as to any State over any child custody proceeding involving an Indian
child who resides or is domiciled within the reservation of such tribe ...
9. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 43-47.
10. See id.
11. C. Steven Hager, ProdigalSon: The "ExistingIndian Family"Exception
to the Indian Child Welfare Act, 27 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 874, 879 (1993); see
also Christine D. Bakeis, The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: Violating Personal Rights for the Sake of the Tribe, 10 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL'Y 543, 569 (1996).
12. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (1994). Although the Bureau of Indian Affairs'
("BIA") Guidelines to the Act specify that this section "is intended to permit a
state court to apply a modified doctrine of forum non conveniens," Guidelines
for State Courts; Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed. Reg. 67,583,
67,591 (1979) (quoting HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 21), courts have applied
it, inter alia, to deny tribal jurisdiction after deciding the substantive question
of the case, i.e., where it is in the child's "best interests" to remain. See, e.g., In
re M.E.M., 635 P.2d 1313, 1317 (Mont. 1981).
13. 25 U.S.C. § 1915 (1994); see, e.g., In re Adoption of F.H., 851 P.2d 1361,
1363 (Alaska 1993) (citing parental preference and the "uncertainty of [the
child's] future," as reasons not to apply the Act).
14. This exception was created by the Kansas Supreme Court in In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168 (Kan. 1982). It allows a state court to determine the "Indian-ness," id., of the parents and thus the "Indian family" by considering the parent(s)' ties to the tribe, "effectively adding a new requirement
or redefining" the term "Indian" in 25 USC § 1903(3)-(4). Toni Hahn Davis, The
Existing Indian Family Exception to the Indian Child Welfare Act, 69 N.D. L.
REV. 465, 489 (1993). It has been extensively adopted by state courts, see generally id., and also generally criticized. See id.; see also, Christine Metteer, The
Existing Indian Family Exception:An Impediment to the Trust Responsibility to
Preserve Tribal Existence and Culture As Manifested in the Indian Child Welfare Act, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 647 (1997).
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quires that a state court determine what it means to be sufficiently "Indian" for the Act to apply.15 This determination in
turn allows state courts randomly to define the term "Indian"
and "Indian child" in 25 U.S.C. § 1903(3)-(4).1" Finally, courts
have refused to apply some sections of the Act at all, such as:
tribal intervention "at any point," 7 and withdrawal of voluntary consent to termination of parental rights or adoption. 8
Such decisions clearly show that the Act's terms are not uniformly defined or consistently applied. Therefore, according
to one practitioner, "[a]s it stands, the outcome of a case involving an 'Indian child' depends... [on] the state in which
the case is being heard." 9
Additionally, state courts that want to retain jurisdiction
to determine placement of Indian children often rule that the
Act is inapplicable to the facts of the case before it. Many
ICWA cases therefore result in protracted litigation as they
wind their way through the appeal system. In these cases
the Indian children involved generally remain with the foster
or adoptive parents with whom they have been placed during
this process. Therefore, even if the state's high court eventually finds the Act applicable, the bonding of the Indian child
with the adoptive or foster parents mitigates against following the Act's placement preferences." In such cases, the
courts have noted that the years involved in "U]udicial and
administrative delays" result in "a great deal of pain and anguish" for all involved.2' Moreover, the United States Su15. Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168.
16. See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(3)-(4) (1994).
17. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c) (1994); see, e.g., Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d
168 (Kan. 1982). The court determined that the Act did not apply, and the tribe
was denied intervention because there was no "existing Indian family," and
even if the Act did apply, the non-Indian mother did not want the children
placed by the tribe and would withdraw consent to adoption so that the child
would be returned to her. Id. at 177.
18. In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507, 515 (Ct. App. 1996). The appellate court overturned a trial court application of the Act to return twin girls to
their Indian family and refused to apply the Act to allow an Indian father to
revoke his consent to the termination of his parental rights unless it was determined upon remand that the Indian father had "significant social, cultural
or political" ties to his tribe. Id. at 516. The appellate court, however, opined
that "no such relationship existed." Id. at 536.
19. Bakeis, supra note 11, at 585.
20. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(b) (1994); see infra notes 24, 184-191 and accompanying text.
21. In re Adoption of Halloway, 732 P.2d 962, 971 (Utah 1986). The Supreme Court in Holyfield similarly observed: "[hiad the mandate of the ICWA
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preme Court has noted that "the law cannot be applied so as
to automatically 'reward those who obtain custody, whether
lawfully or otherwise, and maintain it during any ensuing
(and protracted) litigation.'"2" The courts in these cases, obviously believing that hard cases make bad law, followed the
mandate of the ICWA, and turned the cases over to the
"experience, wisdom, and compassion of the... tribal
courts.""
Not surprisingly, however, the tribal courts in these
cases felt constrained to leave the Indian children with the
non-Indian adoptive parents." Thus, the simple expedient of
initially denying application of the Act, which resulted in
protracted litigation, did reward the non-Indian parents for
obtaining and retaining custody. The tribal courts were
forced to make bad law, in contravention of the stated placement preferences of the Act, in the face of such hard cases.
However, resolution of these inconsistencies by the
United States Supreme Court now seems unlikely. The
Court has twice refused to grant certiorari in a case involving
the use of the existing Indian family exception.25 Additionally, the Court has denied certiorari in a case determining
good cause not to follow the Act's placement preferences, 6 in
been followed [at the inception of the proceedings] much potential anguish
might have been avoided." Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield,
490 U.S. 30, 53-54 (1989).
22. See Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 54 (quoting Holloway, 732 P.2d at 972).
23. Id. (quoting Holloway, 732 P.2d at 972).
24. In Holyfield, the tribal court allowed the adoption of Indian twins by
the prospective adoptive (non-Indian) mother. See Marcia Coyle, After the
Gavel Comes Down: It's Never Over When It's Over, PartiesBefore the Supreme
Court Find Out, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 25, 1991, at 1. Similarly, in Holloway, the
tribal court left the Indian child with the adoptive family with whom he had
lived for six years, although making him legally the son of his Indian mother,
who was to retain visiting rights. See T.R. Reid, Mormon.Navajo Adoption
Fight Settled: White Couple Keeps Indian Child; Biological Mother Retains
Rights, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 1987, at A3. Additionally, in an unreported case
that nevertheless made national headlines, the Navajo tribal court again left an
Indian child with the white couple with whom she had been living for a year,
granting them permanent guardianship, although also enrolling the child in the
Navajo Nation. See Todd J. Gillman, Baby Given to Couple by Navajo Court,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1988, at B1.
25. See In re Baby Boy Doe, 849 P.2d 925 (Idaho), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 860
(1993) (refusing to apply the exception and also raising the issue of whether the
state courts had the right to determine who is eligible for tribal membership);
In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507 (Ct. App. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
693 (1997), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1460 (1997) (applying the exception).
26. In re Custody of S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d 357 (Minn. 1994), cert. denied, 513
U.S. 1127 (1995).

1998]

INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT

423

a case raising issues of tribal notice,27 and in a case raising
issues of good cause not to transfer jurisdiction to the tribal
court. 8 Thus, problems of the state courts' independent interpretation of the ICWA will undoubtedly have to be solved
by congressional amendment of the Act.
In 1995-96, the 104th Congress several times did battle
with amending the ICWA. In May, 1996, the House of Representatives passed a bill that would make the ICWA inapplicable to an Indian child whose parents "do not maintain
affiliation with their Indian tribe." 9 The Clinton administration intimated it would not support such a section because it
"could violate the Tribes' right of self-government."
Eventually, Senator John McCain, then Chair of the Senate
Committee on Indian Affairs, introduced a bill which incorporated some of the detailed proposals of the National Congress of American Indians ("NCAI") and achieved what Senator McCain called a "detailed, but not fragile, compromise."
This bill, Senate Bill 1962,"2 passed the Senate in September,
1996, shortly before the 104th Congress adjourned. It was
reintroduced in the 105th Congress on April 14, 1997, as
Senate Bill 569."3

This bill represents the first step to finding a common
sense, common ground approach to amending the ICWA.
The "hard cases" that involve taking children from adoptive
parents years after the initial suit was brought because of
protracted litigation, have left parties on both sides with raw
emotions. Any amendment to the Act must satisfy traditional adoption advocates, who tend to want to eviscerate the
Act by allowing state courts to determine the Act's applicability; as well as the tribes, who fear a return to the condi27. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc. v. C.A.A, 783 P.2d 1159 (Alaska 1989), cert.
denied, 495 U.S. 948 (1990).
28. See In re Interest of ArmelU, 550 N.E.2d 1060 (Il. App. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 940 (1990).
29. H.R. 3286, 104th Cong. § 301 (1996).
30. Eric Schmitt, Adoption Bill Facing Battle over Measure on Indians,
N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1996, at A19; see generally, Metteer, supra note 14, at 65152.
31. See John McCain, Amity in Indian Adoptions, WASH. POST, Aug. 2,

1996, at A21; see also, S. 1962, 104th Cong. (1996).
32. S. 1962, 104th Cong. (1997).
33. S. 569, 105th Cong. (1997). The House has introduced an identical bill,
H.R. 1082, sponsored by Representative Don Young (R-Alaska). H.R. 1082,
105th Cong. (1997).
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tions of wholesale removal of their children, which led to the
Act in the first place.
This article identifies and analyzes the inconsistencies in
state court applications of the Act, examines the recent proposed congressional amendments to the Act to determine
whether they will achieve consistency among state court
opinions, and determines what further measures are needed
to rectify these inconsistencies.
II. THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT OF 1978
The Indian Child Welfare Act came about in response to
various congressional hearings during the 1970s. The 1974
Senate Oversight Hearings revealed statistics about the
"wholesale removal" of Indian children from their families
and tribes that one witness called "the most tragic aspect of
Indian life today."34 Congress was presented with statistical
studies showing that "25 to 35% of all Indian children had
been separated from their families and placed in adoptive
families, foster care, or institutions."35 In fact, "[t]he risk for
Indian children of being involuntarily separated from their
parents was in many states up to one thousand times greater
than for non-Indian children."" Furthermore, witnesses testified that Indian children suffered "serious social and psychological problems as adolescents and adults."37 Chief Calvin Issac, testifying before Congress, found such separation
"one of the most serious failings" of the pre-ICWA system in
which
Indian children are removed from the custody of their
natural parents by nontribal government authorities who
have no basis for intelligently evaluating the cultural and
social premises underlying Indian home life and childrearing. Many of the individuals who decide the fate of
our children are at best ignorant of our cultural values,
and at worst contemptful of the Indian way and convinced
that removal, usually to a non-Indian household or institution, can only benefit the Indian child.38
34. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 32 (quoting Indian Child Welfare Program,Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs of the Senate Committee on Interior and InsularAffairs, 93d Cong. 3 (1974) [hereinafter Hearings](statement

of William Byler)).
35. Id.
36. Hollinger, supra note 5, at 454.
37. Id. at 455.
38. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 34-35 (quoting Hearings on S. 1214 Before the
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Congress found these statistics so important that they
were codified in 25 U.S.C. § 1901:
Congress finds(3) that there is no resource that is more vital to the continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their
children ....
(4) that an alarmingly high percentage of Indian families
are broken up by the removal, often unwarranted, of their
children from them by nontribal public and private agencies and that an alarmingly high percentage of such children are placed in non-Indian foster and adoptive homes
and institutions; and
(5) that the States, exercising their recognized jurisdiction
over Indian child custody proceedings through administrative and judicial bodies, have often failed to recognize the
essential tribal relations of Indian people and the cultural
and social standards prevailing in Indian communities
and families."

The ICWA therefore embodies Congress' intent that "'an
Indian child should remain in the Indian community'.

. .

by

making sure that Indian child welfare determinations are not
based on 'a white, middle-class standard which, in many
cases, forecloses placement with [an] Indian family.'"' ° It
protects "the rights of the Indian child as an Indian and the
rights of the Indian community and tribe in retaining its
children in its society."4 '
The act has several times been the subject of further
Oversight Hearings in which, for example, the tribes argued
to amend the Act to preclude the use of the existing Indian
family exception ' and to create clearer, stricter tribal notice
requirements.4 '3 Finally, in 1987, in response to the "still disproportionally high rate of Indian parent-child separations,4
Subcommittee on Indian Affairs and Public Lands of the House Committee on
Internior and InsularAffairs, 95th Cong. 191-92 (1978)).
39. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(3)-(5) (1994).
40. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 37 (quoting HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 23).
41. Id. (quoting HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 23).
42. See Hollinger, supra note 5, at 481 (citing In re Adoption of Baby Boy L,
643 P.2d 168 (Kan. 1982)).
43. See id. at 491.
44. John Robert Renner, The Indian Welfare Act and Equal Protection
Limitations on the Federal Power over Indian Affairs, 17 AM. INDIAN L. REV.
129, 130 (1992).
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the Senate introduced a bill (Senate Bill 1976) to significantly expand the rights and protections afforded to Indian
children, families, and tribes.45 However, to date, the original
Act of 1978 remains unchanged.
The ICWA includes both procedural and substantive
provisions to forward Congress' purpose of protecting Indian
children and tribes by "the establishment of minimum
[f]ederal standards for the removal of Indian children from
their families and the placement of such children
in ... homes which will reflect the unique values of Indian

culture." Its procedural provisions include a dual jurisdictional scheme in which the tribe has exclusive jurisdiction
"over any child custody proceeding involving an Indian child
who resides or is domiciled within the reservation of such
tribe," except "where such jurisdiction is otherwise vested in
In addition, 25
the State by existing Federal law."47
U.S.C. § 1911(b) provides that when an Indian child is not
domiciled on a reservation, "the court, in the absence of good
cause to the contrary, shall transfer such proceeding to the
48
jurisdiction of the tribe, absent objection of either parent."
The United States Supreme Court has found 25
U.S.C. § 1911(b) to create "concurrent but presumptively
tribal jurisdiction in the case of children not domiciled on the
0
reservation."' 9 These provisions are "the heart of the ICWA"
in that they mandate "tribal primacy in matters of child custody and adoption."" Further procedural requirements include, inter alia, 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c), which provides for
tribal intervention "at any point" in a state court proceeding
involving foster care placement or termination of parental
rights," and 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) which provides that notice
be given to the tribe "in any involuntary proceeding where
45. Id. For example, the proposed amendments "largely removed" the Act's
provisions allowing parental veto of transfer of jurisdiction to tribal court and
good cause to deny transfer to tribal court under 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b). Id. The
bill also eliminated the good cause provision in the placement preferences. See
id. at 173.
46. 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (1994).
47. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (1994).
48. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (1994). "Good cause" was intended to be a modified
form of forum non conveniens. See In re Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action No. S-903, 635 P.2d 187, 189-91 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981); In re Adoption of
S.S., 657 N.E.2d 935, 943 (IM.1995).
49. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 36.
50. In re Adoption of Holloway, 732 P.2d 962, 965 (Utah 1986).
51. Id. at 966.
52. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c) (1994).
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the court knows or has reason to know that an Indian child is
involved.""3 Additionally, 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) provides that
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt "that the continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to
result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child"
be established before a court may order involuntary termination of parental rights."
The ICWA also provides substantive provisions conferring certain rights and privileges on Indian children, parents,
and tribes. Among these are provisions for establishing voluntary termination of parental rights, including the requirement that consent to termination be "executed in writing and
recorded before a judge of a court of competent jurisdiction
and accompanied by the presiding judge's certificate that the
terms and consequences of the consent were fully explained
in detail and were fully understood."55 The Act also provides
that in any adoption placement under state law, an Indian
child be placed according to a set of preferences. These provide that the child be placed, "1) with a member of the child's
extended family; 2) other members of the Indian child's tribe;
or 3) other Indian families," absent "good cause to the contrary."56 The Supreme Court has found the placement pref-

erences to be "the most important substantive requirement
imposed on state courts."57 Finally, 25 U.S.C. § 1914 provides
that any violation of 25 U.S.C. § 1911, § 1912, or § 1913 allows a tribe to petition to invalidate the subject action. 8
III. INCONSISTENCIES IN STATE COURT APPLICATIONS OF
THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT

A. The "ExistingIndianFamily" Exception
One of the most problematic inconsistencies in state
court decisions regarding the ICWA's application is the use
or rejection of the so-called "existing Indian family" exception
which, since 1982, has been the center of both judicial and

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
(1989).
58.

25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (1994).
25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) (1994).
25 U.S.C. § 1913(a) (1994).
25 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1994).
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 36
25 U.S.C. § 1914 (1994).
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scholarly controversy.59 By its own terms, the ICWA specifies
that it applies to any child who is either "(a) a member of an
Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian
tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian
tribe."0 The only exceptions allowed by Congress are "a
placement based upon an act which, if committed by an
adult, would be a crime, or upon an award, in a divorce proceeding, of custody to one of the parents."6 However, although the ICWA is federal legislation affecting Indian tribes
and their members, and as such is "the exclusive province of
federal law,"" state courts wanting to retain jurisdiction,
place Indian children in contravention of the placement preferences or refuse to allow Indian parents to revoke consent to
voluntary foster care or adoption placements, have carved
out an exception to the Act's applicability.
This exception, sometimes referred to as a "minimum
contacts" or "significant relationship/ties" test," has been especially problematic because of its overlap in other areas of
state court determinations. For example, insufficient contacts, relationships, or ties to a tribe have been used to find
"good cause" not to transfer jurisdiction to the tribe under
25

59. Although it is difficult to keep an accurate tally since new states come
into the controversy each year and sometimes a state changes its position on
the exception, there is a large and nearly evenly divided split among the states
embracing and rejecting the exception. Embracing the exception are In re
T.R.M., 525 N.E.2d 298 (Ind. 1988); In re S.A.M., 703 S.W.2d 603 (Mo. App.
1986); In re S.C., 833 P.2d 1249 (Okla. 1992); In re Adoption of Baby Boy D.,

742 P.2d 1059 (Okla. 1985); Claymore v. Serr, 405 N.W.2d 650 (S.D. 1987); In re
Adoption of Crews, 825 P.2d 305 (Wash. 1992), as well as Christine Bakeis, supra note 11. Rejecting the exception are In re T.N.F., 781 P.2d 973 (Alaska
1989); In re CrystalK., 276 Cal. Rptr. 619 (Ct. App. 1990); In re Junious M., 193
Cal. Rptr. 40 (Ct. App. 1983); In re A Child of Indian Heritage, 543 A.2d 925

(N.J. 1988); In re Baade, 462 N.W.2d 485 (S.D. 1990); In re S.B.R., 719 P.2d 154
(Wash. Ct. App. 1986), as well as Davis, supra note 14, at 465. Additionally,
there is some controversy among legal scholars of the Act about which side of
the exception a state has come down on. Compare Davis, supra note 14, at 482
(listing In re Adoption of Lindsay C., 280 Cal. Rptr. 194 (Ct. App. 1991) as criticizing the exception), with Bakeis, supra note 11, at 572 (listing In re Adoption
of Lindsay C., 280 Cal. Rptr. 194 (Ct. App. 1991) as accepting the exception).
60. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (1994).
61. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1) (1994).
62. County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 234 (1985)
(interpreting the Indian Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3).
63. See Renner, supra note 44, at 160 (minimum contacts used to determine
subject matter rather than territorial jurisdiction); In re Bridget P., 49 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 507, 516 (Ct. App. 1996) (parents must have "significant relationship"
with the tribe).

1998]

INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT

429

U.S.C. § 1911(b)," to refuse to allow tribal intervention under
25 U.S.C. § 1911(c)," to refuse to deem the child an "Indian"
child within 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4),6" and to refuse to allow parents to revoke consent to foster care or adoption placements
under 25 U.S.C. § 1913(b)-(c) because they are not "Indian"
within 25 U.S.C. § 1903(3).7 Thus, instead of relying on the
Act's own definitions of "Indian child" and Indian "tribal
68
member," the courts have devised a "second litmus test" to
manipulate the application and implementation of the Act by
variously defining their own criteria for "Indian-ness."
The exception was created in 1982 when the Kansas Supreme Court, in In re Baby Boy L. ,69 refused to apply the Act
because the child was not being removed from what the court
deemed an "existing Indian family."" In that case, the child
was the illegitimate son of an Indian father and a non-Indian
mother.7 Over the objection of the father and his American
Indian tribe, the mother had voluntarily given up the child at
birth for adoption by non-Indian parents. 2 The court reasoned that the intent of the Act was to prevent "removal of
Indian children from an existing Indian family unit and the
resultant breakup of the Indian family."" The court therefore found that the Act did not apply to "an illegitimate infant who has never been a member of an Indian home or culture,... [and] so long as the mother is alive to object, would

probably never become a part of the [father's] or any other
64. See infra note 163 and accompanying text.
65. See infra note 205 and accompanying text.
66. See infra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
67. See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
68. Davis, supra note 14, at 489. In addition to ties to the tribe, courts also
consider whether the child has been exposed to or raised in an Indian "cultural
setting," and if so, whether the child has spent sufficient time in the Indian culture. Id. Both considerations are again subjective, and allow courts to variously define "cultural setting" and "sufficient time."
69. 643 P.2d 168 (Kan. 1982).
70. Id. at 176.
71. Id. at 172.
72. Id. at 172. In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168 (Kan. 1982),
represents the most common scenario in which the exception has been invoked:
challenges by unwed Indian fathers (who are Tribal members) and their Tribes
to the adoption of their illegitimate children, born to non-Indian mothers. Usually these children have never lived with the father or with any other Indian
family and the mother wants the child placed with a non-Indian family. See In
re Adoption of Baby Boy D., 742 P.2d 1059 (Okla. 1985); Claymore v. Serr, 405
N.W.2d 650 (S.D. 1987); see generally, Davis, supra note 14.
73. Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d at 175.
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Indian family."
Courts employing the exception in this scenario generally employ a "minimum contacts"7 5 analysis to determine
whether the child's ties to its Indian father and tribe are sufficient in order to determine whether or not the Act applies.
In this type of analysis, the courts, which "normally use
'minimum contacts' as a due process test for territorial jurisdiction.., use the test.., as an alternative method for defining subject matter jurisdiction .... A court would define
an individual as 'Indian' only if he possessed some minimal
relationship with a reservation, such as membership or cultural ties."76
In addition to the split of authority in cases involving an
illegitimate child of a non-Indian mother and Indian father,
the exception has split courts on the issue of the Act's applicability to the child of an Indian mother who had previously
consented to a non-Indian placement of her child, and later
seeks to use the Act to invalidate that consent.77 In In re
Adoption of T.R.M.,7" for example, an Indian mother changed
her mind about the adoption of her child by a non-Indian
couple, an adoption she had agreed to almost one year earlier.79 When she sought to invalidate the adoption under the
ICWA, the court found that since the child had lived only a
few days with her Indian mother, she was not part of an existing Indian family, and therefore the adoption proceeding
did not "constitute[ I a 'breakup of the Indian family.' 8 °
However, in a classic example of an inconsistent, or ambiguous, application of the Act, three years after the Indiana Supreme Court applied the exception in T.R.M., the same court
held in In re D.S.8' that "where the mother is a Native American Indian, the mother and child, at least presumptively for

74. Id.
75. Davis notes that the courts generally find that "[tihe contacts between
the child and the father and the child and the father's tribe have usually been
minimal." Davis, supra note 14, at 480-81.
76. Renner, supra note 44, at 160-61 (footnote omitted).
77. See Davis, supra note 14, at 486.
78. 525 N.E.2d 298 (Ind. 1988).
79. Id. at 302.
80. Id. at 303 (referring to 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d)); see also, In re Adoption of
Crews, 825 P.2d 305, 310 (Wash. 1992) (refusing to find the Act applicable
"when an Indian child is not being removed from an Indian cultural setting, the
natural parents have no substantive ties to the tribe, and neither the parents
nor their families have resided or plan to reside within a tribal reservation.").
81. 577 N.E.2d 572 (Ind. 1991).
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the purposes of initiating ICWA inquiries, constitute an
'Indian family.'"8 2 Therefore, the court, among other things,
reversed itself on the definition of an "Indian family," now
finding that an Indian mother and child were an existing Indian family and therefore came within the Act's stated pur3
pose of "prevent[ing] the breakup of the Indian family."
Recently, in a variation on this scenario, a California appellate court extended the exception far past the narrow factual parameters of Baby Boy L., in which the child "would
probably never become a part of... any... Indian family."'
In In re Bridget R.,85 a California appellate court applied the
exception in a case involving twin daughters of an American
86
Indian father who was a member of the Pomo tribe and a
87
mother who was of the Mexican Indian Yaqui tribe, who
were living together with their two other children, though

not married at the time of the twin girls' birth.88 The twins'

grandmother soon after contacted the Pomo tribe, requesting
intervention; she told the tribe that she wanted the twins
82. Id. at 574.
83. Id. (footnote omitted).
84. In re Adoption of Baby Boy L, 643 P.2d 168, 175 (Kan. 1982).
85. 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507 (Ct. App. 1996).
86. The father became a member by virtue of his birth in 1972, at which
time the tribe recognized members "solely by custom and tradition, under
which any lineal descendent of a historic tribal member was automatically a
member of the Tribe and was recognized as such from birth." Id. at 516-17.
The father and his twin daughters formally enrolled approximately four
months after the twins' birth. Id.
87. Id. at 516. The parents sought to place the twins for adoption before
their birth. Id. at 517. During the course of the proceedings, the father told
the attorney handling the case that he was part Pomo Indian. The attorney
allegedly told the Indian father that recording his ancestry would make adoption more difficult. Id. The Indian father then revised the form and omitted
reference to his Native American ancestry. In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d
507 (Ct. App. 1996). These facts were reported in greater detail locally during
the trial below. See James Rainey, Birth Parents to Get Twins, Judge Rules,

L.A. TIMES, June 15, 1995, at A36.
88. In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 516 n.3. The court stated that "the
facts... are... substantially undisputed." Id. The twins were born in November, 1993, and approximately one month later, the Indian father told his
mother of their birth and of his relinquishment of them. Id. at 518. In early
February 1994, the twins' grandmother contacted the Pomo tribe. Id.
The tribe then requested intervention in the proceedings and asked that
the twins' father be allowed to rescind his relinquishment. Id. The agency
handling the placement refused, and the twins remained with the family seeking to adopt them, who did not formally file for adoption until May 4, 1994. Id.
At the June 1995 trial, the judge ordered the twins returned to their birth parents. In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 515.
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placed within the extended paternal family.89 However, the
California court embraced the exception and found that the
ICWA does not and cannot apply to invalidate a voluntary
termination of parental rights respecting an Indian child
who is not domiciled on a reservation, unless the child's
biological parent, or parents, are not only of American Indian descent, but also maintain a significant social, cultural, or political relationship with their tribe.9 °
Unlike the child in Baby Boy L., however, the twins are
part of a very real Indian family, biologically, tribally, and
culturally, who want to raise these girls in an Indian home.
The Act clearly seems to apply in this case because the twins
became enrolled members of their Indian tribe within three
months of their birth and had been previously eligible for
membership as biological children of a member of the tribe,9
as required by 25 U.S.C. §1903(4). Additionally, the proceeding was not a divorce or delinquency proceeding, the only
Indian child custody proceedings to which the ICWA is inapplicable.92
When faced with such a scenario, other state courts have
refused to apply the exception, generally citing two reasons:
the plain language of the Act provides for no such exception,
and the United States Supreme Court, in Holyfield,93 rejected
a "minimum contacts" or "significant relationship" test.
First, some courts have noted that the problem with the
existing Indian family exception is that "[tihe language of the
Act contains no such exception to its applicability, and... it
[is not] appropriate to create one judicially."9 ' Therefore, in
In re Adoption of a Child of Indian Heritage," the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the Kansas court's reasoning in
In re Baby Boy L. and determined that the existing Indian
family exception violates the congressional intent behind the
Act because
89. In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507, 516 (Ct. App. 1996)
90. Id.
91. See id. at 516-17.
92. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1) (1994).
93. 490 U.S. 30 (1989).
94. In re Junious M., 193 Cal. Rptr. 40, 46 (Ct. App. 1983); see also, In re
Dependency and Neglect of N.S., 474 N.W.2d 96, 100 (S.D. 1991) (Sabers, J.,
concurring). "There is simply no statutory requirement for [the child] to have
been born into an Indian home or community in order to come within the provisions of the ICWA, however much one might believe 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) should
have been written that way." Id. (Sabers, J., concurring).
95. 543 A.2d 925 (N.J. 1988).
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it posits as a determinative jurisdictional test the voluntariness of the conduct of the [parent(s)] ... the Act itself
specifies procedures for voluntary terminations of parental
rights... the application of the ICWA to voluntary... adoptions is not inconsistent with the purposes of
the Act ....The effect on both the tribe and the Indian
child of the placement of the child in a non-Indian setting
6
is the same whether or not the placement was voluntary.
Similarly, the South Dakota Supreme Court in In
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found that the clear terms of the Act
Adoption of
require only that an "'Indian child' is the subject of a 'child
98
custody proceeding' as those terms are defined by the Act."
In addition, some courts have noted that Congress considered
and rejected language which would have restricted the
application of the ICWA.99
Secondly, many courts rejecting the existing Indian family exception look to Holyfield as a watershed case and find
that after the United States Supreme Court's decision, the
exception is invalid. The Supreme Court in Holyfield found
that one reason for the presumption against application of
state law is "the danger that 'the federal program would be
impaired if state law were to control.'.

.

. For this reason, 'we

look to the purpose of the statute to ascertain what is intended.'"1"' The Supreme Court reasoned that "the numerous
prerogatives accorded the tribes through the ICWA[I]...
must be seen as [Congressional intent to] ...

protect not only

96. Id. at 932.
97. 462 N.W.2d 485 (S.D. 1990).
98. Id. at 490; see also, N.S., 474 N.W.2d at 101 n.(unnumbered) (Sabers, J.,
concurring) ("there is simply no statutory requirement for N.S. to have been
born into an Indian home or an Indian community in order to come within the
provisions of ICWA"); In re Crystal K, 276 Cal. Rptr. 619, 622 (Ct. App. 1991)
(noting that the only exceptions provided for inthe Act are for child custody
disputes arising from divorce proceedings and placements of Indian children
resulting from juvenile delinquency proceedings).
99. See, e.g., Nelson v. Hunter, 888 P.2d 124, 126 n.4 (Or. Ct. App. 1995)
(citing 6 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7538-39, 7558-63 (1978)). Congress rejected language in ICWA that would restrict application of the Act to enrolled members
1995)
of the tribe. Id.; see also, In re Adoption of S.S., 657 N.E.2d 935, 951 (Ill.
(Congress rejected proposal that Indian child have "significant contacts" with
the tribe in order to invoke tribal jurisdiction under the ICWA); In re Guardianship of Ashley Elizabeth R., 863 P.2d 451, 454 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993) (lack of
contact with tribe rejected in BIA Guidelines as "good cause not to transfer"
proceedings to tribe).
100. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 43-44
(1989) (citations omitted).
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the interests of individual Indian children and families, but
also of the tribes themselves." 1 The Court focused on Congress' intent to protect Indian children and tribes from
"cultural" removal rather than removal from what individual
state courts might variously define as an existing Indian
family. The Supreme Court therefore held that the Act applied even to twins who had been placed with a non-Indian
family at birth and had never been on the reservation or
spent time with their Indian family.0 2
Courts rejecting the exception do so because they view
Holyfield as standing for the proposition that "even without
contact with the tribe or reservation since birth, and even
though [the] Indian parents did not want tribal involvement.., the tribal court was the appropriate forum to determine the custody of children of members of the tribe."03
Soon after the Holyfield decision, the Alaska Supreme Court
declined to invoke the exception, noting that Holyfield stood
for the proposition that "Congress did not seek simply to protect the interests of individual Indian parents. Rather, Congress also sought to protect the interests of Indian tribes and
communities, and the interests of Indian children themselves."' The Alaska court, in fact, believed that "the adoption in T.R.M. was exactly the type of scenario in which Congress sought to impose federal safeguards in order to protect
the rights of Indian parents and their tribe."' 5
Additionally, in 1991, a California court, in In re Adoption of Lindsay C., 106 reasoned that "Holyfield has raised new
questions regarding the continuing viability of Baby Boy L.
and its progeny." 7 The Lindsay C. court then held that the
Act applied to the illegitimate child of an Indian father and
non-Indian mother, even when the child had spent seven
years living with a non-Indian family.' 8 This holding is a
strong challenge to the Baby Boy L. court's reasoning that a
child who had spent less than a year and one-half in a non101. Id. at 49.
102. Id. at 53.
103. In re Interest of Armell, 550 N.E.2d 1060, 1068 (Ill.
App. 1990) (citation
omitted).
104. In re Adoption of T.N.F., 781 P.2d 973, 977 (Alaska 1989).
105. Id.
106. 280 Cal. Rptr. 194 (Ct. App. 1991).
107. Id. at 199. The court relied on Holyfield's reasoning that "[t]ribal jurisdiction under [the Act] was not meant to be defeated by the actions of individual members of the tribe." Id. (quoting Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 49).

108. Id.
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Indian family was not being taken from an existing Indian
family.
Similarly, in Yavapai-Apache Tribe v. Mejia,0 9 a Texas
appellate court reasoned that the Act is not limited to children taken from an existing Indian family, and that "Indian
tribes still ha[ve] a legitimate interest in the welfare of
members who [do] not have previous significant contact with
the tribe or the reservation.""' The court found that by the
terms of the Act itself"' "only when a parent is not available
and the child is over five years of age should a state court intervene and make a determination involving lack of contact
with a tribe.""'
Moreover, courts have found that the application of the
judicially created existing Indian family exception ignores
Congress' admonition, codified in 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5), that
"the States... have often failed to recognize essential tribal
relations of Indian people, and the cultural and social standards prevailing in Indian communities and families."" In
fact, virtually all courts rejecting the exception do so because
they view the Act's underlying assumption to be that "it is in
the Indian child's best interest that its relationship with the
tribe be protected."" '
Based on the interpretation of the ICWA by the Supreme
Court in Holyfield, many states have re-evaluated their prior
use of the existing Indian family exception. Oklahoma recently passed legislation calling for state courts to "recognize
that Indian tribes and nations have a valid governmental interest in Indian children regardless of whether or not said
children are in the physical or legal custody of an Indian par109. 906 S.W.2d 152 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995).
110. Id. at 171.

111. See 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (1994).
112. Id.
113. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5) (1994).
114. In re Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action S-903, 635 P.2d 187, 189
(Ct. App. Ariz. 1981); see In re Junious M, 193 Cal. Rptr. 40 (Ct. App. 1983)
and its post-Holyfield progeny in California, In re Kahlen W., 285 Cal. Rptr.
507 (Ct. App. 1991); In re Adoption of Lindsay C., 280 Cal. Rptr. 194 (Ct. App.
1991); In re Crystal K, 276 Cal. Rptr. 619, 625 (Ct. App. 1990) ("Pima stated
the purpose of the Act was to establish minimum federal standards... to prevent the separation of Indian children from their family, tribal and cultural
heritage .... ."). See also Barbara Ann Atwood, Fighting over Indian Children:
The Uses and Abuses of JurisdictionalAmbiguity, 16 UCLA L. REV. 1051, 1062

(1989) ("The Act clearly rests on the congressional belief that the best interests
of Indian children would be served by protecting the tribal role.").

436

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

ent or Indian custodian at the time state proceedings are initiated."115 Similarly, the North Dakota Supreme Court invalidated its previous holding in Claymore v. Serr,"1 in which
it had invoked the existing Indian family exception, stating,
it is incorrect, when assessing the ICWA's applicability to
a particular case, to focus only on the interests of an existing Indian family .... Such a practice fails to recognize
the legitimate concerns of the tribe that are protected under the act .... "Holyfield also carries the clear message
that [ICWA] must be read liberally, perhaps creatively, to
protect the rights of the tribe even against the clearly expressed wishes of the parents .... ,""
However, recent decisions, such as Bridget R., show that the
existing Indian family exception is still being used to avoid
application of the Act, and continue to show that the outcome
of a case involving an Indian child depends not only on the
state in which the case is being heard, but also on the court
within that state."8
B. Inconsistent Definitions
1. Definition of "Indian"
The problem most closely intertwined with the existing
Indian family exception is state courts' different determinations of who is an "Indian child" for purposes of the Act. 25
U.S.C. § 1903(4) specifies only that the child need be a member of the tribe or eligible for membership as the biological
child of a member."9 The Act, however, contains no defini-

115. 10 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 § 40.1 (West Supp. 1995) (footnotes and citations omitted). This piece of legislation may have the effect of invalidating
the cases invoking the Existing Indian Family exception. See In re Adoption of
Baby Boy D., 742 P.2d 1059 (Okla. 1985); In re S.C., 833 P.2d 1249 (Okla. 1992).
116. 405 N.W.2d 650 (S.D. 1987).
117. In re Adoption of Baade, 462 N.W.2d 485, 489-490 (N.D. 1990) (citation
omitted) (invalidating Claymore, 405 N.W.2d 650); see also, In re Baby Girl
Doe, 865 P.2d 1090, 1095 (Mont. 1993), in which the Montana Supreme Court
found that "[iut is clear from the legislative findings and expressions of policy,
and the United States Supreme Court's application of the ICWA... that the
principle purposes of the Act are to promote the stability and security of Indian
tribes by preventing further loss of their children; and to protect the best interests of Indian children by retaining their connection to the tribes."
118. Compare In re Bridget 1R, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507 (Ct. App. 1996) (second
district), with In re Junious M., 193 Cal. Rptr. 40 (Ct. App. 1983) (first district),
and In re Crystal K, 276 Cal. Rptr. 619 (Ct. App. 1990) (third district).
119. See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (1994).
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tion of tribal membership.12 ° Therefore, the application of the
Act and the operation of its substantive provisions is often
dependent upon who determines tribal membership, the
tribes themselves or the individual state courts.
Neither the questions of who should decide tribal membership nor how state courts should make this determination
are answered consistently. For example, in a particularly
hard case, the Supreme Court of Oregon refused to allow the
mother of a child to revoke consent to adoption under the Act
when the mother had initially stated that she did not know of
any Indian heritage, but three weeks later determined that
She then officially registered with
she was part Cherokee.'
the tribe, who later filed an affidavit stating that the mother
and father were registered members.'22 In the absence of
statutory language specifying admissibility of evidence in determining applicability of the Act, the court applied the state
Evidence Code. 22 The court then found the affidavit of the
Registrar of the Cherokee Nation to be hearsay and refused
to admit testimony by the father that he was a member.2 4
Although the court accepted the fact that the "Cherokee Nation requires particular facts be established for eligibility,"
the court would not accept the evidence offered by the tribe
that the parents and child did meet those criteria, although
the court failed to specify what evidence would have been acceptable.'25
Other state courts have ruled counter to Quinn on three
points: the Act specifies no time frame for determining tribal
membership with respect to the Act,'26 there is no time limit
in which to establish the paternity of a tribal member,'2 v and
determination of tribal membership is the exclusive province
of the tribes, not the states, and as such, is conclusive. 2 ' Un120. See In re Angus, 655 P.2d 208, 212 (Or. Ct. App. 1982). This is probably
because different tribes have different methods of determining their own members, and therefore this power is reserved for the tribes. See Santa Clara
Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 n.32 (1978).
121. See Quinn v. Walters, 881 P.2d 795, 798 (Or. 1994).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 800.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See In re Kahlen W., 285 Cal. Rptr. 507, 511 (Ct. App. 1991); YavapaiApache Tribe v. Mejia, 906 S.W.2d 152, 172-73 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995).
127. Yavapai-Apache Tribe, 906 S.W.2d at 172-73.
128. See In re Adoption of Riffle, 902 P.2d 542, 545 (Mont. 1995).
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der such reasoning, a California court, in In re Kahlen W.,"'
held that notice to the tribe was required even if the Indian
status of the child is not certain at the time the proceedings
began.' Similarly, a Texas court, in Yavapai-Apache Tribe
v. Mejia, held that it was unnecessary for the father of an illegitimate child to establish paternity prior to invoking the
Act.' The Texas court reasoned that to do so would "further
erode the family unit at a time when this country and Indian
tribes are involved in a struggle to maintain the integrity of
the family."' The court therefore found the father to be an
"Indian parent" under the Act.'
Additionally, in Junious M.,"" the California appellate
court held that the trial court's determination that the child
was not an "Indian child" within the meaning of the Act because neither he nor his mother was an "enrolled" member of
the tribe, was in error.3 5 The court, realizing that the tribe
and not the state court was to determine membership, admitted that "[e]nrollment is not always required ...[as] [slome

tribes do not have written rolls."' The court therefore held
that tribal notification of the proceedings was required under
the Act.'
Similarly, the Montana Supreme Court in In re Adoption
of Riffle 8 found that the trial court's determination that a
child is not an "Indian child" under the Act, because of her
blood quantum (one eighth), was erroneous. 9 The court held
that "[bIlood quantum does not dictate whether or not an individual is to be considered an 'Indian child' pursuant to
° The court found that the tribe was "the ultimate
ICWA."" O
authority on eligibility for tribal membership," not only over
state court determinations, but also over the Bureau of Indian Affairs ("BIA") Guidelines, and found that the tribe's de129. In re Kahlen W., 285 Cal. Rptr. 50 (Ct. App. 1991).
130. Id. at 511.
131. Yavapai-Apache Tribe, 906 S.W.2d at 173.
132. Id. at 174.
133. Id. at 175.
134. 193 Cal. Rptr. 40 (Ct. App. 1983).
135. Id. at 45.
136. Id.; see also, In the Interest of H.D., 729 P.2d 1234, 1238 (Kan. Ct. App.
1986) (quoting United States v. Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260, 1263 (9th Cir.
1979)).
137. See In re Junious M., 193 Cal. Rptr. 40, 44 (Ct. App. 1983).
138. 902 P.2d 542 (Mont. 1995).
139. Id. at 545.
140. Id.
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termination is "conclusive.""' The court therefore found the
ICWA applicable to the proceedings. 142

Thus, the inconsis-

tencies regarding who is an Indian, for purposes of the Act's
applicability, stem immediately from state courts' independent and various determinations of who is to determine tribal
membership and by what criteria.
2. Definition of "Good Cause"
a. "Good Cause" not to TransferProceedings to the
Tribe
Under 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b), a state court "shall transfer"
a child custody proceeding involving an Indian child to the
child's tribe, absent objection by either parent or "good cause
to the contrary," subject to declination by the tribal court."3
However, the Act does not define "good cause;" therefore,
state courts have had a field day finding good causes.
Most state courts have relied on the BIA Guidelines to
determine "good cause."'" Under these Guidelines, "good
cause" not to transfer a case to the tribal court includes: (1) a
proceeding that was at an advanced stage when the petition
for transfer was received and the tribe did not file promptly
after receiving notice, (2) the necessary evidence in the case
cannot be adequately presented in tribal court without undue
hardship to the parties or witnesses (forum non conveniens),
and (3) the parents of the child are unavailable and the child
has little or no tribal contact.""45 Alternatively, the Guide-

lines prohibit consideration of the socio-economic conditions
of the tribe and the perceived inadequacy of tribal or BIA
services or judicial systems." 6
However, each of these "good causes" has itself been
variously defined by the state courts. The first of these, untimely delay by the tribe, has been found to exist when there
was a five month delay between the notice to the tribe of
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (1994).
144. The BIA Guidelines are accorded great weight in construing the ICWA,
but they are not binding upon the courts. See In re Interest of Armell, 550
N.E.2d 1060, 1065 (Il. Ct. App. 1990) (citation omitted).
145. Guidelines for State Courts; Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed.
Reg. 67,583, 67,591 (1979).
146. Id.
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termination proceedings and tribal petition for transfer, a
The court
year and a half after the proceedings began.'
obvious...
found "[t]he significance of this chronology...
[since during this time the Indian child] had bonded to his
foster-adoptive family. " 148

On the other hand, in In re

J.L.P.,' the court found that tribal intervention "one year after it received notice of the proceedings[ ]... can be con-

strued as a prompt request for transfer of jurisdiction."50
Secondly, state courts have inconsistently found good
cause under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The BIA
Guidelines state that good cause is found under a "modified
doctrine of forum non conveniens."'' The doctrine is modified
in that courts usually use the doctrine to refuse taking jurisdiction themselves; however, under 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b), the
courts use the doctrine to decide whether the tribal court is
inconvenient.152

Many courts have used this doctrine to deny transfer,
especially when the parents are not living on the reservation." 3 For example, while admitting that "[aipplication of
this criterion will tend to limit transfers to cases involving
children who do not live very far from the reservation[,]" the
court in Yavapai-Apache Tribe v. Mejia' found that "undue
hardship to parties and witnesses" was sufficient to deny
transfer.'55 Even though the Arizona tribe offered to sit in
Houston in order to have the case transferred to its jurisdiction, the Texas court refused, noting that there was no
authority that authorized a tribal court to "sit outside its territorial limits and issue binding orders and judgments."'58
However, using distance from the tribal court as good
147. In re Robert T., 246 Cal. Rptr. 168, 172 (Ct. App. 1988); see also, In re
Appeal in Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JS-8287, 828 P.2d 1245 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1991) (tribe waited two years to petition, after notification).
148. Robert T., 246 Cal. Rptr. at 173.
149. 870 P.2d 1252 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994).
150. Id. at 1257-58.
151. Guidelines for State Courts; Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed.
Reg. at 67,591.
152. See Yavapai-Apache Tribe v. Mejia, 906 S.W.2d 152, 165 (Tex. Ct. App.
1995).
153. See In re Alexandria Y., 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 679 (Ct. App. 1996); In re T.S.,
801 P.2d 77 (Mont. 1990); Yavapai-Apache Tribe, 906 S.W.2d at 165.
154. 906 S.W.2d 152 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995).
155. Id. at 166.
156. Id. The court did note that the BIA guidelines suggested that the
problem might be "alleviated in some instances by having the court come to the
witnesses." Id. (citation omitted).
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cause not to transfer a case to the tribe will allow many cases
involving indisputably Indian children to be heard by state
courts, in direct contravention of the "presumptively tribal
jurisdiction" envisioned by the Act for non-domiciliaries.'5 7
Therefore, other courts have refused to apply the doctrine to
establish good cause not to transfer. For example, in In re
Armell, 5 8 the Illinois court allowed transfer to the tribal
court in Kansas."9 The court used essentially the same reasoning as the Texas court in Yavapai-Apache Tribe to come to
the opposite conclusion. The court argued that "liberal expansion of the forum non conveniens doctrine would preclude
transferring jurisdiction to tribal courts except in cases
where the child resides on or near a reservation."'60 Since the
child involved lived in California, the court reasoned that it
was no more inconvenient to hear the case in Kansas than in
Illinois.'
However, in the most extreme example, a Pennsylvania
court remanded a case involving the termination of a
mother's right to revoke consent to adoption for a determination of the mother's fitness (rather than transferring to the
tribal court), even though the mother lived on the reservation."2 This meant, ultimately, that the state court decided
the child's placement, based on its determination of the
child's best interests. The tribe, therefore, had no say in determining the placement of a child of a domiciliary of the reservation.
Such scenarios exemplify another state court determination of good cause not to transfer the proceeding to the
tribe-consideration of the Indian child's best interests.
Again, courts are split as to whether or not the best interests
of the child involved are a valid consideration in determining
the jurisdiction of the case (a preliminary inquiry to deter6 3
mining the substantive question of the child's placement).
157. See Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 36
(1989) (stating that 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) creates "concurrent but presumptively
tribal jurisdiction in the case of children not domiciled on the reservation.").
158. 550 N.E.2d 1060 (Ill. Ct. App. 1990).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1067.
161. Id.
162. In re K.L.R.F., 515 A.2d 33 (Pa. 1986).
163. Interestingly, courts considering whether the child's best interest is an
appropriate consideration in denying transfer of jurisdiction to the tribe are
divided in their determination of this question along the same lines as they are
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The BIA Guidelines suggest that the best interest of the child
Neverthehas no place in jurisdictional determinations.'
less, many courts which defer to the Guidelines in determining other good cause factors'65 do not follow the Guide16 6
lines in determining jurisdiction under 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b).
Most courts which use a best interests of the child analysis to determine jurisdiction do so on the basis that the Congressional intent of the ICWA is to "protect the best interests
of Indian children."'67 In fact, in In re T.R.M., the Indiana
Supreme Court found such a determination "paramount."
The best interests test for finding good cause not to
transfer to the tribe was initiated by the Montana Supreme
Court in In re M.E.M.'69 In this decision, the court instructed
the district court that not only could the good causes outlined
in the BIA Guidelines be used to prevent transfer to the
tribe, but so could the best interests of the child involved,
upon a clear and convincing showing by the state. 7 ° The
courts following Montana's lead have found clear and convincing evidence that an Indian child's best interests would
be served by denying transfer of jurisdiction to the tribes
most often in testimony that the child had "bonded" with the
foster or adoptive parents,' and/or that it would be psychologically damaging to remove the child from his or her presdivided over the question of whether the Act applies to children not taken from
an "existing Indian family," or children who may not have close ties to the tribe.
Thus, the court in In re T.S., 801 P.2d 77 (Mont. 1990), agreed with the district
court that transfer to tribal jurisdiction should be denied because it was not in
the child's best interests since she had no previous contact with the tribe. Id.
at 81. However, courts rejecting the existing Indian family/significant contacts
exception also reject the best interest of the child test in determining jurisdiction. See Yavapai-Apache Tribe v. Mejia, 906 S.W.2d 152, 171 (Tex. App. 1995)
(history of contacts is not an appropriate consideration for determining good
cause not to transfer); In re Interest of Armell, 550 N.E.2d 1060, 1065 (Ill. Ct.
App. 1990) ("an Indian child's lack of present contacts with a tribe or reservation should not be used to justify denying transfer .... ).
164. See Yavapai-Apache Tribe, 906 S.W.2d at 168 (citations omitted).

165. See supra notes 144 and 152 and accompanying text.
166. The author wishes to express her indebtedness to Ms. Carol Abernathy
for this insight, and for much of the analysis on good cause not to transfer jurisdiction to the tribe based on the child's best interests and lack of contacts.
167. 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (1994).
168. In re T.R.M., 525 N.E.2d 298, 307 (Ind. 1988).
169. In re M.E.M., 635 P.2d 1313 (Mont. 1981).
170. See Jeanne Louise Carriere, Representing the Native American: Culture,
Jurisdiction,and the Indian Child Welfare Act, 79 IOWA L. REV. 585, 615
(detailing the facts of M.E.M., 635 P.2d at 1317).

171. See In re Appeal in Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JS-8287, 828
P.2d 1245, 1250-51 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991); In re Robert T., 246 Cal. Rptr. 168,
175 (Ct App. 1988).
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ent living situation. 7 '
However, many courts have refused to use the best interests test to determine jurisdiction because they find that
"the best interest test is relevant to issues of placement, not
jurisdiction."7 ' These courts, setting in context the phrase
from 25 U.S.C. § 1902, "to protect the best interests of Indian
children," reason that Congress intended to "protect the best
interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and
security of Indian tribes and families.""' Thus, looking at the
best interests of Indian children as the sole criterion for applying the Act, "defeats the very purposes for which the Act
was enacted, for it allows Anglo cultural biases into the picture.""5 These courts further reason that by answering the
substantive issue of the case-where is the Indian child best
placed-in order to determine jurisdiction, the best interests
test illustrates a state court's assumption that "relying on an
Indian determination... would not truly result in what is
best for the Indian child... [which] defeats the sovereignty
of Indian tribes in custody matters; the very idea for which
the ICWA was enacted. 6
Another group of cases have followed the BIA Guidelines
and determined, contrary to cases such as Robert T and Alexandria y,'77 that "any psychological effects the transfer may
have... are not factors which should be considered when deThe Arnell court recognized the
ciding jurisdiction."'7 8
172. See Robert T., 246 Cal. Rptr. at 175; Maricopa County, 828 P.2d 1245,
1250-51 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991); see also, In re Alexandria Y., 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d
679, 682 (Ct. App. 1996) (expert testimony from a psychologist that removal of
child from her present circumstances would cause her to suffer "negative emotional consequences").
173. Yavapai-Apache Tribe v. Mejia, 906 S.W.2d 152, 170 (Tex. Ct. App.
1995); see also, In re Interest of Armell, 550 N.E.2d 1060, 1065 (Ill. Ct. App.
1990) ("[C]onsiderations involving the best interests of the child are relevant,
not to determine jurisdiction, but to ascertain placement."); In re Guardianship
of Ashley Elizabeth R, 863 P.2d 451, 456 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993).
174. 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (1994).
175. Yavapai-Apache Tribe, 906 S.W.2d at 170.
176. Id.; see also, In re J.L.P., 870 P.2d 1252, 1258 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994).
177. See supra, notes 171-72, and accompanying text.
178. Armell, 550 N.E.2d at 1065; see also, In re J.RH., 358 N.W.2d 311, 322
(Iowa 1984) ("[Clultural and socioeconomic considerations.., would clearly be
inappropriate under the ICWA.").
Interestingly, the M.E.M. court was divided on just this point, for the dissent argued that "[iut cannot... be 'good cause' to refuse transfer of the proceedings to a tribal court on the perception that the tribal court may not act
with respect to the child in the way we would wish it to act. The purpose of the
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"potentially disruptive effect transfer of this case to the tribal
court could have" on the Indian child, but determined that its
holding in the case was not related "to placement but to jurisdictional considerations ....[and w]e have no reason to
believe that the ...tribal court ...will not ...be sensitive
to the best interests of [the Indian child]."'79 This reasoning
seems to stem from the fact that these courts, as well as the
United States Supreme Court, believe that the Act is based
on a "fundamental assumption that it is in the best interests
of the Indian child not to be separated from the tribe."'
Thus, the best interests test for determining good cause not
to transfer shows a split in jurisdictions not only in terms of
whether the test is appropriate, but also in the determination
of what is in the best interest of an Indian child.
b. "Good Cause" Not to Follow Placement Preferences
A similar split occurs in state court determinations of
whether an Indian child's best interests are "good cause" not
to follow the placement preferences outlined in 25
U.S.C. § 1915. The Act specifies that in adoptive placement,
"a preference shall be given, absent good cause to the contrary, to a placement with (1) a member of the child's extended family; (2) other members of the child's tribe; or (3)
other Indian families." 8' Again, the BIA Guidelines define
good cause. They specify that to show good cause there must
be one or more of the following considerations: (1) the request of the biological parents or the Indian child if of a sufficient age, (2) the extraordinary physical or emotional needs
of the child, as established by a qualified expert, or (3) the
unavailability of suitable families for placement after a diligent search has been completed." 2
As in determining good cause not to transfer proceedings
to the tribes, courts which fail to follow the Act's placement
preferences most often do so because they apply a best interests of the Indian child test, and then make an Anglo deter[ICWA] is to remove as far as possible the white man's perceptions in these
matters where Indian values may conflict." In re M.E.M., 635 P.2d at 1319
(Sheehy, J., dissenting).
179. Armell, 550 N.E.2d at 1069.
180. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 50 n.24
(1989) (quoting In re Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action No. S-903, 635
P.2d 187, 189 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981)).
181. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1994).
182. Guidelines for State Courts; Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed.
Reg. at 67,594.
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mination of the Indian child's best interests. Generally, the
factors cited as "good cause" based on the child's best interests are the child's need for a permanent placement and the
psychological attachment or bonding the child has established with the foster or adoptive parents.
For example, in In re Adoption of F.H.,83 the Alaska Supreme Court found that good cause not to follow the Act's
placement preferences may include a consideration of "the
best interests of the child" and found good cause to place the
child with non-Indian adoptive parents because of the bond
between the Indian child and the adoptive mother, and the
"uncertainty of the child's future if the adoption were not allowed." 8 The court found the uncertainty of the child's future good cause to deviate from the placement preferences although the child's maternal cousin was the "first place
adoptive placement preference under ICWA" and the Division of Family and Youth Services had conducted a "home
study" and concluded that F.H. should be placed with her.'85
The court reasoned that since "further legal proceedings
would have been necessary for a permanent adoption" by the
child's cousin, the child's situation would be "uncertain" if
her non-Indian adoptive parent's adoption petition were dismissed, and upheld the trial court's finding of good cause to
deviate from the placement preferences.'86
Similarly, in In re Bridget R.,"' the California appellate

court raised a constitutional challenge and determined that
all children have a right to a placement that is "stable [and]
permanent.""' The court, therefore, found that Indian twins
had a "constitutionally protected interest in their relationship with the only family they have ever known.""' 9 Based on
such reasoning, the court refused to apply the Act, honor the
parents' revocation of consent to the adoption of their children, and place the twins with the immediate paternal fam-

183. 851 P.2d 1361 (Alaska 1993).
184. Id. at 1363.
185. Id. at 1362.
186. Id. at 1365; see also In re Interest of Bird Head, 331 N.W.2d 785, 791
(Neb. 1983) ("best interests of the child in are paramount"); In re T.R.1, 525
N.E.2d 298, 308 (Ind. 1988) (good cause not to follow the placement preferences
based on child's emotional attachment to her adoptive parents).
187. 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507 (Ct. App. 1996).
188. Id. at 524.
189. Id. at 526.
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These courts' views have troubled other courts, however,
because they defy the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Holyfield, that
[wihile stability in child placement should be a paramount
value, it cannot be the sole yardstick by which the legality
of a particular custodial arrangement is judged. Such a
standard would reward those who obtain custody, whether
lawfully or otherwise, and 19maintain it during any ensuing
(and protracted) litigation. 1
Some courts, therefore, refuse to apply the best interests test
to determine good cause not to follow the placement
preferences.
In In re S.E.G.,92 for example, the Minnesota Supreme
Court reversed an appellate court decision approving the
Alaska court's determination in In re F.H. that "a child's
need for permanence may be considered in determining the
child's extraordinary emotional needs, although by itself the
need for permanence does not constitute 'good cause' to deviate from the adoption placement preferences in the Act."'93
Relying on the plain language of the Act, its legislative history and the United States Supreme Court's reasoning in Holyfield, the Minnesota Supreme Court determined that "a
finding of good cause cannot be based simply on a determination that placement outside the preferences would be in the
child's best interests."94 The court noted that "[p]roblems
can arise when a system that is largely white, with middleclass values is called upon to evaluate cultural and racial
' 95
'
norms that are neither white nor necessarily middle-class.""
The court reasoned that "the plain language of the Act read
as a whole and its legislative history... [make it] 'most improbable' that Congress intended state courts to find good
cause whenever they determined that a placement outside
the preferences of 25 U.S.C. § 1915 was in the child's best in-

190. Id.
191. In re Adoption of Halloway, 732 P.2d 962, 971-72 (Utah 1986) (citation
omitted); see also, Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S.
30, 54 (1989).

192.
193.
194.
195.

521 N.W.2d 357 (Minn. 1994).
In re Custody of S.E.G., 507 N.W. 872, 885 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
In re Custody of S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d 357, 362 (Minn. 1994).
Id. at 364 (citing Minnesota Supreme Court Task Force on Racial Bias

in the Judicial System, 16 HAMLINE L. REV. 477, 631 (1993)).
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terests."96 The Minnesota Supreme Court found that the appellate court had defined the need for "permanence" as the
need to be adopted, rather than placed with an available Indian foster family, a definition so "narrow[ ] as to threaten or
in Native American homes,"
substantially reduce placements
197
and therefore reversed.

Similarly, in a case in which the Montana Supreme
Court distinguished its previous holding in M.E.M.,

8

the

court cited the plain language of the Act and its legislative
intent, as well as the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Holyfield, in support of its reasoning that state court determinations regarding Indian children "are a part of the
problem the ICWA was intended to remedy.""' The court
reasoned that the best interests standard "by its very nature,
requires a subjective evaluation of a multitude of factors,
many, if not all of which are imbued with the values of majority culture."2 °° The court therefore refused to consider the
best interests of the child as good cause for deviating from
the placement preferences, finding such a test an
"unnecessary and inappropriate analysis under the ICWA."0 '
Thus, the split in the courts' reasoning, not only about
whether the good cause/best interests test is an appropriate
consideration in determining whether to deviate from the
placement preferences, but also about what an Indian child's
best interests are, parallels the split apparent in the good
cause/best interests analysis used in denying transfer of the
proceedings to the tribe. In fact, as the Montana Supreme
Court2 pointed out, some courts even seem to confuse the
tWo.

20

196. Id. at 362-63 (citing Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 45).
197. Id. at 364.
198. The court noted:
[In M.E.M., we stated that, in determining whether to transfer jurisdiction to the tribal court, "the best interest of the child could prevent
transfer upon 'clear and convincing' showing by the state." [In this instance,] however, we are not considering the transfer of jurisdiction to
a tribal court; rather we are considering adoption placement preferences ....
In re Riffle, 922 P.2d 510, 514 n.1 (Mont. 1996).
199. Id. (citing Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 44-45).

200. Id.
20L Id. at 515.
202. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
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C. Refusal to Apply Provisions of the Act
The invocation of the existing Indian family exception
and their independent and varied definition of terms of the
Act, as illustrated above, have allowed state courts to determine in some instances that the ICWA does not apply at all,
thereby leading to further inconsistencies. The most problematic areas are determinations of whether a tribe will be
allowed to intervene in a child custody proceeding, whether
and when a tribe must be given notice of such a proceeding,
and whether and when an Indian parent may revoke consent
to a foster care or adoptive placement.
1.

Tribal Intervention

As part of its jurisdictional provisions, 25 U.S.C.
§ 1911(c) allows a tribe to "intervene at any point" in a "state
court proceeding for the foster care placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child." °3 However, in the
furthest-reaching denial of a tribe's right to intervene, the
Kansas Supreme Court, after creating the existing Indian
family exception in In re Baby Boy L.,'°* then used it to uphold the trial court's holding that the tribe could not intervene."5 The trial court had denied intervention because the
intervention request was not filed within twenty days, and
further found that 25 U.S.C. § 1911 would not apply because
the child was the illegitimate child of a non-Indian mother
and the proceeding was a voluntary adoption. 6 Though
finding that the Act did not apply and the tribe was not entitled to intervene since the child was not taken from an existing Indian family, the Kansas Supreme Court also stated
that, even if the Act did apply to the proceedings and the
tribe was allowed to intervene under 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c), the
trial court's error would have been harmless because the
placement preferences of the Act would not have been followed since the mother would have revoked consent to the
adoption.0 7 The Kansas Supreme Court determined that under such circumstances the tribe's intervention would have
been "useless."0 8

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

25 U.S.C. § 1911(c) (1994).
643 P.2d 168 (Kan. 1982).
See id.
Id. at 174.
Id. at 177.
Id.

1998]

INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT

449

However, some courts, after determining that
25 U.S.C. § 1911(c) did not apply, have nevertheless allowed
the tribe to intervene under state law which protects the
rights of parties with an interest in the subject litigation."' °
In these cases, the courts broadly interpret the purpose of the
Act to protect the independent right of the tribe in retaining
its children in its society as sufficient interest.210
However, in In re A.E.V., " ' the Colorado appellate court
found that the tribe did not have sufficient interests to allow
it to intervene either under the Act or as an interested party
under state law. 12 In that case, the children involved did not
become members of the tribe until the tribe adopted a resolution which broadened membership three years after the proceedings. Only then did the tribe officially accept the children as members. 12 Although the court recognized that
Congress sought to protect the tribes' interest in their children, the court reasoned that the tribe had no identifiable interest because "the Tribe had notice of dependency and neglect action and of foster placement, [but] it failed to change
its membership requirements until several years after the
placement." "
In addition, although 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c) states that a
tribe has the right to intervene in a proceeding for foster care
placement or termination of parental rights, the right does
not seem automatically to apply when such a termination
was voluntarily consented to and/or when preliminary to an
adoptive (as opposed to foster care) placement. However,
some courts have determined that despite the maxim "unius
est exclusio alterius"(the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another), the Act does not prohibit intervention in
such cases.
For example, in In re J.R.S.,211 the Alaska Supreme

Court interpreted 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c) as "distinguish[ing] between 'adoptive placement' and 'termination of parental
rights'; only in the latter case does 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c) sup-

209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

See In re Baby Girl A., 282 Cal. Rptr. 105 (Ct. App. 1991).
See, e.g., id.
782 P.2d 858 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989).
Id. at 859.
Id.
Id. at 860.
690 P.2d 10, 15 (Alaska 1984).
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port intervention." 18 However, the court also reasoned that
nothing in the Act's legislative history allowed the contrary
conclusion, that tribes were forbidden to intervene in adoptive proceedings.217 Therefore, the court found that the Act
"does not limit a state court's power to allow intervention in
such cases," and allowed the tribe to intervene based upon
Alaska state law which allows intervention in an action in
which one has an interest which cannot be otherwise protected.218 While seeming to come to its determination that
the trial court's decision was "fatally flawed" under state law,
the court based its reasoning on the Act itself. The court
found that the tribe had a substantial interest in having the
Act's placement preferences followed and retaining its children, and thus must be allowed to participate in a proceeding
in which the rights Congress sought to protect under the
ICWA were implicated.219
In Baby Girl A.,220 the California appellate court, fourth

district, later analogized to J.R.S. to determine that the Act
did not expressly grant a tribe intervention in "adoptive
placement[s]." 22 ' The court then similarly found that the
tribe had a right to intervene under state law as a party "who
has an interest in the matter in litigation."222 This court, too,
relied on the intent of the Act to determine that "the interests of the tribe under the Act are sufficiently important to
2 23
support allowing it to join this proceeding."

Another California court not only refused to apply the
existing Indian family exception to deny a tribe intervention,
but also broadly interpreted the Act to allow tribal intervention regardless of whether or not the proceeding was voluntary. 224 In In re Lindsay C.,22' the court based its holding on
the reasoning of Holyfield, in which the Supreme Court determined that the application of the Act to protect the tribes'
interests in their children, as specifically defined as Congress' policy in 25 U.S.C. § 1902, "cannot be any different be-

216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

Id. at 15.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 16-17.
Id. at 15.
282 Cal. Rptr. 105 (Ct. App. 1991).
See id. at 108.
Id. at 109.
Id.
See In re Lindsay C., 280 Cal. Rptr. 194 (Ct. App. 1991).
Id.
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cause the [Indian child is] 'voluntarily surrendered' by [the
Indian parent.]"22
Therefore, as the above cases demonstrate, the tribes'
right to intervene as defined by 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c) has been
inconsistently determined. This is due to the courts' use or
rejection of the existing Indian family exception to determine
the Act's applicability, the courts' broad or narrow interpretation of the tribes' interest in retaining their children, and
the voluntariness of the proceeding before the court.
2. Notice to Tribes
Since "the tribe's right to assert jurisdiction over the proceeding or to intervene in it is meaningless if the tribe has no
notice that the action is pending,"227 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) provides that in any involuntary proceeding in a state court,
where the court knows or has reason to believe that an Indian child is involved, the party seeking foster care placement or termination of parental rights "shall notify ...the

child's tribe, by registered mail with return receipt requested, of the pending proceedings and of their right of intervention.""' Along with the specific requirements of notice
set out in 25 U.S.C. § 1912(c), federal regulations require
that notice include:
the child's name, birthdate and birthplace; the child's
tribal affiliation; the parents' or Indian custodians' names,
birthdate, birthplace and the mother's maiden name; a
copy of the petition or other document by which the proceeding was initiated; and a statement of the right of the
biological parents, Indian custodians and the Indian tribe
to intervene in the proceedings. 29
Despite these rigorous requirements, many hard cases
result because tribes are not given timely notice. Tribes may
"learn about the placement, if at all, indirectly, often after
the child has lived with prospective adopters for a long time,
or after the adoption decree has been granted."2 ° "[T]he emo226. Id. at 198-99 (quoting Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield,
490 U.S. 30, 49 (1989)).
227. In re Junious M., 193 Cal. Rptr. at 40, 42 (Ct. App. 1983).
228. 25 U.S.C.§ 1912(a) (1994).
229. In re Pedro N., 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 819, 821 n.2 (Ct. App. 1995) (citing 25
C.F.R. § 23.11(a), (c), (d)(1)).
230. Hollinger, supra note 5, at 491 (citing Oversight of the Indian Child
Welfare Act of 1978: HearingBefore the Senate Select Comm. on IndianAffairs,
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tional toll on all parties, especially the Indian child, is
heavy." 3' Secondly, although courts have consistently held
that failure to comply with the notice provisions of the Act
requires remand,"' courts are split on what will constitute
compliance.
Many courts, for example, have held that strict compliance with the notice requirements is not necessary; substantial compliance will suffice."' Others require strict compliance with the Act's requirements. 3 ' The courts are split over
whether there need be strict compliance in four main areas:
the time frame of the notice, the mailing requirements, the
specific information which the tribe must be given, and the
certainty of the child's "Indian-ness."
First, courts are split about when notification must be
given. In In re S.Z.,"3 ' for example, the court found that although notice was not sent until after the parents' first court
appearance (in contravention of 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) which
requires that no foster care or termination proceeding commence until ten days after receipt of notice by the tribe) the
tribe was not prejudiced by the delay because it did receive
notice one year before the final adjudication took place.236
Another court, however, has held that immediate notice is
mandatory no matter how late in the proceeding a child's
tribal affiliation is discovered, and that a tribe's mere
"awareness" of a proceeding is not sufficient.211 That Court
also found that the agency causing the delay could not argue
that rapid resolution of the case, to the exclusion of delayed
tribal notice, is in the best interests of the child. 8'
Second, courts are split over whether or not there need
be strict compliance with the mailing requirements. Several
courts have held that the notice need not be sent by regis100th Cong. 106 (1987)).
231. Hollinger, supra note 5, at 491.
232. See In re Kahlen W., 285 Cal. Rptr. 507, 513 (Ct. App. 1991).
233. See e.g. In re M.S.S., 936 P.2d 36, 40 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) ("technical
compliance with the act is not required if there has been substantial compliance
with the notice provisions of the ICWA").
234. See Kahlen W., 285 Cal. Rptr. at 511 (stating that although "there are
cases applying the Act which hold technical compliance is not required where
there has been substantial compliance with the notice provisions of the
Act ...the statute and all cases applying the Act unequivocally require actual
notice to the tribe").
235. 325 N.W.2d 53 (S.D. 1982).
236. S.Z., 325 N.W.2d at 55.
237. See Kahlen W., 285 Cal. Rptr. at 511.
238. Id. at 514.
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tered mail, with return receipt requested, although specifically required in 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a). The South Dakota Supreme Court in, In re S.Z., allowed use of certified mail. 39
Additionally, the California sixth district court of appeal
found that telephone calls, letters by regular mail, and
faxes, 4° while not in strict compliance with the Act, did not
prejudice the tribe's interests. 4 '
Courts have also split over whether there must be strict
compliance with the substance of the notice as specified in
the Act. In In re S.Z.,24 2 for example, the court held that al-

though the notice sent to the tribe did not specifically inform
the tribe of the right to intervene as required by 25
U.S.C. § 1912(a), the "general tenor" of the notice informing
the tribe of the pending proceeding and the Act's independent
provision for tribal intervention in 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c), was
substantial compliance with the Act's notice requirement, especially since the ICWA had only been in effect for approximately two weeks.2 4' However, the California court in Kahlen

W.2'" held that notice is insufficient under the Act if the tribe
is not informed of its right to intervene, or the consequences
of the failure to intervene, or of the right to request a continuance.245
Finally, courts have split over whether notice must be
given to the tribe when the child's Indian heritage and/or the
specific tribal affiliation cannot be positively determined. In
fact, the fifth district California court of appeal is itself split,
and provides a clear example.4 6 In In re Pedro N.,54 the fifth

district did not allow an Indian mother to raise a notice issue
on appeal when she had broadly stated her tribal affiliation
as "Mono."248 The Department sent notice to the BIA because
239. See S.Z., 325 N.W.2d 53; see also, In re A.L. 442 N.W.2d 233 (S.D. 1989).
240. See In re Krystle D., 37 Cal. Rptr. 132, 136 n.2 (Ct. App. 1994).
241. See id. at 142.
242. 325 N.W.2d 53 (S.D. 1982).
243. Id. at 55-56. The dissent noted that the recent enactment of the ICWA,
if anything, argued for, rather than against, strict compliance with the notice
requirements. Id. at 57 (Wolhman, J., dissenting).
244. 285 Cal. Rptr. 507 (Ct. App. 1991).
245. Id. at 512-13.
246. The court in In re Pedro N., however, distinguished Kahlen W on the
fact that there, the Indian mother made no showing that she knew the consequences of her Indian status and knowingly relinquished them. Pedro N., 41
Cal. Rptr. 2d 819, 823 (Ct. App. 1995).
247. 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 819 (Ct. App. 1995).
248. Id. at 821.
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it understood that the Mono tribe was Canadian, not a federally recognized tribe. 4" At a later hearing the Indian mother
represented her tribe as "Northfork," a California tribe of
Mono Indians. 5 ' However, the appellate court found that the
mother's appeal on the issue of delay of notice to the tribe
was not timely because she waited two years after the court
terminated her rights."' The court effectively found either
that there was no "reason to know" that the mother was of a
federally-recognized tribe, or that if there was reason to
know, the possibility that the Mono tribe was Canadian was
sufficient reason not to require strict compliance with 25
U.S.C. § 1912(a)'s requirement that the tribe be notified if
the court "has reason to know that the child is an Indian."252
However, in In re Kahlen W., the court found that the
status of the Indian child need not be certain in order for the
notice requirements to apply, and if the state cannot locate or
ascertain the tribe, there is still an affirmative obligation to
give notice to the BIA to enable it to continue with efforts to
' Additionally, the court found that "[n]otice
locate the tribe. 53
is mandatory, regardless of how late in the proceedings the
child's possible Indian heritage is uncovered."
One final problem area facing state courts on the notice
requirement is 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a)'s specification that notice
is required in "involuntary" state court proceedings without
mention of notice in voluntary proceedings. Therefore, the
Act seems to limit notice to involuntary proceedings, while
making no such limitation in the tribal intervention "in any
state court proceeding" provision of 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c).
Since it is very unlikely that a tribe can intervene in a voluntary proceeding under 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c) if it has no notice
of the proceeding, these sections of the Act seem to be in conflict. However, rather than make the more logical assumption that 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c) and 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a), when
read together, make it apparent that the notice requirements
specify involuntary proceedings while not excluding volun' courts have usually required strict comtary proceedings, 55
249. Id. at 822.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 823.
252. See 25 U.S.C. § 1912(c) (1994).
253. In re Kahlen W., 285 Cal. Rptr. 507, 512-13 (Ct. App. 1991).
254. Id. at 513 (citing In re Junious M., 193 Cal. Rptr. 40 (Ct. App. 1983)).
255. See In re J.R.S., 690 P.2d 10, 16 (Alaska 1984). The J.R.S. court found
that by specifying intervention in foster care placements the Act did not ex-
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pliance with the Act's specification that the proceeding be involuntary.25 6 However, as one judge has recognized:
[t]he tribe's right to intervene as provided by the statute
would be hollow and without practical effect if there was
not a duty imposed upon the court to ensure that the tribe,
in fact, had been notified and given the opportunity to respond as is required in an involuntary termination proceeding.2 7
He reasoned that since the purpose of the Act as a whole was
to "help Indian tribes preserve their identity,... a tribal
right to notice [in voluntary proceedings] is necessarily
implicit in the tribe's fundamental and unqualified
intervention right under 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c)."258
This
reasoning was based upon the United States Supreme
Court's conclusion in Holyfield, which had been decided a few
months earlier, that "Congress determined to subject
[placements of Indian children in non-Indian homes] to the
ICWA's jurisdictional and other provisions, even in cases
where the parents consented to an adoption, because of
concerns going beyond the wishes of individual parents."259
Thus, not only is 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) subject to inconsistent
application, it is also ripe for inconsistent interpretation visA-vis the 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) intervention provision, with
which it must necessarily work in tandem.
3.

Voluntary Withdrawal of ParentalConsent

A final inconsistency in the Act's application occurs in
determining an Indian parent's right to withdraw consent to
termination of his or her parental rights. The ICWA provides
that such consent "shall not be valid unless executed in
writing and recorded before a judge of a court of competent
jurisdiction and accompanied by the presiding judge's certificate that the terms and consequences of the consent were

clude intervention in adoptive placements. Id. The court relied on the warning
that the maxim "expressio unius," the expression of one thing is the exclusion of
another, is applicable only under certain circumstances and must be applied
cautiously. Id.
256. See Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc. v. C.A.A., 783 P.2d 1159, 1160 (Alaska
1989).
257. Id. at 1161-62 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
258. Id. at 1162-63 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
259. Id. at 1162 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting) (quoting Mississippi Band of
Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 50 (1989)).
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fully explained in detail and were fully understood."6 ° In addition, the ICWA provides for a withdrawal of consent to foster care placement "at any time," 6' and withdrawal of consent to termination of parental rights to adoptive placement
of an Indian child "at any time prior to the entry of a final
decree of termination or adoption, as the case shall be."62
However, courts are split not only about whether to follow the letter of the Act, in allowing nearly absolute revocation of consent to Indian parents, but also about whether to
apply this section of the Act at all. Courts applying 25
U.S.C. § 1913 and strictly following its provisions proceed
from the presumption that "Congress was not concerned with
the reason a parent might have for withdrawal of consent.
The Act unquestionably provides a higher standard of protection to the rights of [Indian] parents in termination proceedings."2"' When the requirements of this higher standard are
not met, the Indian parent's consent is deemed invalid under
the Act.264
Interpreting the letter of 25 U.S.C. § 1913(b)-(c), some
courts have found that "a purely consensual placement [of an
Indian child] is... merely temporary... until such time as a
final decree fixing parental rights and awarding permanent
custody is entered." 65 In its furthest-reaching implications,
25 U.S.C. § 1913 means that "[w]hen an Indian child within
the purview of the Act is involved, adoption agencies and
prospective adoptive parents must be held to assume the risk
that a[n Indian] parent.., might change her mind before the
adoption is finalized. 66 Under such reasoning, courts have
allowed an Indian parent to revoke consent months and even
years after it was given, far into the custody proceeding, even
260. 25 U.S.C. § 1913(a) (1994).
261. 25 U.S.C. § 1913(b) (1994).

262. 25 U.S.C. § 1913(c) (1994).
263. In re Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action No. S-903, 635 P.2d 187,
192 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981); see also, In re Adoption of K.L.R.F., 515 A.2d 33 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1986).
264. See In re Angus, 655 P.2d 208 (Or. Ct. App 1982) (finding Indian parents entitled to return of child when consent to placement given before, or
within, ten days of birth, and not given before a judge who certifies that the
parents understood the consequences of the consent); see also, In re Baby Boy
Doe, 902 P.2d 477 (Idaho 1995) (finding Indian mother's consent found invalid
when it was obtained without judge's certification that the terms and consequences of the consent were fully explained to her).
265. KL.R.F., 515 A.2d at 37.
266. In re Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action No. S-903, 635 P.2d 187,
192 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981).
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though adoption was the "ultimate objective" of the parent at
the time of consenting to a termination of parental rights.267
Such "hard cases" have persuaded some courts to refuse
to apply the Act to the action before it, or to severely limit its
broad protections. In these instances Indian parents are not
afforded the Act's greater protections.
For example, in In re Adoption of Crews, 8 the Washington Supreme Court noted that at trial, the court determined
that the Act did not apply because the court determined that
the child was not eligible for membership in his tribe until
some months after his birth.269 More importantly, in affirming the trial and appellate court rulings, the Washington
court determined that although the child might have been an
Indian child "based on the Choctaw Constitution, we do not
find an existing Indian family unit or environment from
which [he] was removed or to which he would be returned."70
The court found that even if it were to apply the ICWA, the
Act's provisions would not invalidate the termination of the
Indian mother's parental rights because under the Act, a
parent's right to withdraw consent is cut off "once a final decree of termination is entered even if the adoption is not yet
final."2 71 The court reasoned that 25 U.S.C. § 1913 refers to
two kinds of consent: termination of parental rights and consent to adoption, and that
[a] consent to termination may be withdrawn at any time
before a final decree of termination is entered; a consent to
adoption at any time before a final decree of adoption. If
Congress had intended consents to termination to be revocable at any time prior to entry of a final decree of adoption, the words "as the case may be" would not appear in
the statute.2
Alternatively, courts have found that the parent's revocation of consent and the subsequent return of the child to
267. See KL.R.F., 515 A.2d at 35-36; Pima County Juvenile Action No. S903, 635 P.2d at 189 (consent revoked six months after given, but before final

decree of adoption).
268. 825 P.2d 305 (Wash. 1992).
269. Id. at 308; see supra notes 121-25 and accompanying text); see also, In
re Quinn, 881 P.2d 795 (Or. 1994) (refusing to apply the Act to a child who was
not an "Indian" by the court's definition).
270. See Adoption of Crews, 825 P.2d at 310.
271. Id. at 311 (citations omitted).
272. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting In re J.R.S., 690 P.2d 10, 14 (Alaska
1984)).
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his or her Indian parent is not in the child's best interests.
For example, in Hampton v.J.A.L,273 the trial court allowed
an Indian mother to revoke consent to adoption, but nonetheless awarded custody of the Indian child to the adoptive
parents, which the court determined would be in the child's
best interests.27 ' The appellate court then went even further,
overturning the portion of the judgment below that decreed
that the Act applied, and then affirming the judgment below
"inall other respects."27
Interestingly, the California court in In re Bridget R.,76
managed to do both, first refusing to apply the Act to Indian
parents without sufficient contacts with the tribe, and then
arguing that even if the Act applied and the voluntary termination of parental rights was found invalid, the children's
best interests would argue against returning them to their
natural parents.277 In Bridget R., the court applied the existing Indian family exception to determine that the Act did
not apply to parents who did not maintain a "social, cultural,
or political relationship" with the tribe.278 Therefore, the
court found that the parents could not revoke their consent to
the adoption of their twins because under California law, a
parent's right may be waived, if the waiver is knowingly and
intelligently made. 79 Moreover, the court concluded that the
Indian parents knowingly waived their parental rights "for
reasons which reflected that their primary concern was for
the twins' future welfare." 8 ° The court reasoned that in this
case, the parents' knowing waiver, at very least, constituted
a "voluntary subordination of their constitutional rights to
those of the children," and found that the children had a
"constitutionally protected interest" in staying with the prospective adoptive family. 81
Additionally, the court reasoned that even if the Act applied, the revocation of parental consent was not absolutely
273. 658 So. 2d 331 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
274. See id.
275. Id. at 337. But see Owens v. Willock, 690 So. 2d 948, 952 (La. Ct. App.
1997) (finding the best interest of the child is not a question for the state court
to decide and distinguishing Hampton on the basis of the exclusive tribal jurisdiction in the Owens case).
276. 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507 (Ct. App. 1996).
277. Id.
278. Id. at 516.
279. Id. at 525.
280. Id. at 532.
281. Id. at 526.
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guaranteed because
[t]he reach of section 1913 is limited by the twins' interest
in having a stable and secure home, which... is an interest of constitutional dimension .... [W]e believe it would
be a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to remove a child from a stable
placement, based upon statutory
2 violations which occurred
in making the placement .... 28
In this extremely hard case, the court left the children
with their adoptive parents and remanded the case to determine whether the parents had sufficient ties to the tribe to

warrant application of the Act. 23 However, the court implied
that applying 25 U.S.C. § 1913 would be unconstitutional if it
were interpreted to afford Indian parents greater protection
of their parental rights at the expense of the state court's determination of the best interests of the Indian children. 28 '
Therefore, as in courts' refusal to apply the jurisdictional and
placement provisions of the Act, courts have refused to apply
the higher standard of protection afforded to parents by 25
U.S.C. § 1913 when they find that the child is not being
taken from an existing Indian family and that the parents'
interests conflict with what the court might perceive as the
best interests of the Indian child.
D. Inconsistency Due to the Act's Silence
The ICWA contains no provision to determine whether
and when a party's rights may have been prejudiced because
of a failure to divulge the Indian status of the parent(s)
and/or child, either unintentionally or willfully. Usually,
these cases involve a birth parent who voluntarily gave up a
child for adoption and at that time either did not know or did
not divulge his or her Indian status. Later, when the Indian
status of the parent was discovered, either the parent or the
tribe has tried to assert rights, either to revoke parental consent to the placement under 25 U.S.C. § 1913,88 or, in the
282. In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507, 533 (Ct. App. 1996).
283. Id. at 536-37.
284. See id. at 526.
285. See In re Interest of Armell, 550 N.E.2d 1060 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)
(mother failed to divulge her Indian status and later sought to revoke consent
under the Act); In re Adoption of a Child of Indian Heritage, 543 A.2d 925 (N.J.
1988) (child's Indian heritage was unknown to court at time of proceeding and
Indian father, who had not acknowledged paternity at the time of proceedings,
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case of the tribe, to take jurisdiction or intervene in the proceedings under 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) or 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c). 8 '
In these cases, the courts have had no guidelines to follow in
their determinations.
What has emerged is an ad hoc set of rules synthesized
from a few cases. Generally, courts have found that a simple
failure to divulge affiliation with an Indian tribe (even if
there was an opportunity to do so), does not stop a party from
asserting his or her rights under the Act.287 What is necessary is purposeful deception or willful concealment which
'
prejudices a party's rights. 88
Thus, courts have found that
even when there was a question of fact about the "good faith
behavior of the ...attorney" involved in the case in concealing an Indian parent's heritage, such concealment, even if
willful, is not significant if it "did not materially affect petitioner's rights."8 9 Similarly, courts have found that neither a
social services agency nor the court itself has a duty to investigate a child's Indian ancestry. 9°
Such unguided determinations, however, have opened
the way for another hard case. In In re Bridget R.,29' a California court found that an Indian father purposefully concealed his Indian heritage when acting on the advice of the
' The attorney had told
attorney handling the adoption case. 92
the father to change the form he had filled out identifying
himself as "one quarter American Indian," and fill in his
"basic ethnic group" as "white," in order to prevent the adopcould not assert his rights under the Act).
286. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Halloway, 732 P.2d 962 (Utah 1986) (mother
and aunt purposefully tried to conceal removing the child from the reservation).
287. See Armell, 550 N.E.2d at 1067 (holding against the public guardian's
contention that Indian mother should be estopped from asserting her rights
under the Act because she remained silent about her Indian heritage for two
and one half years). The Armell court found that "[tihe ICWA provides no basis
to deny [the Indian mother] the power to exercise her rights ....[Tihe ICWA
gives parents the absolute right to withdraw their consent to adoption at any
time up to the time a final decree is granted." Id.
288. See In re Adoption of Crews, 825 P.2d 305, 312 (Wash. 1992). "[I]f a
child's Indian status is not known due to failure to disclose information regarding the child's ancestry and the petitioner is prejudiced thereby, even an
adoption decree may be challenged." Id. (citing In re Adoption of a Child of Indian Heritage, 543 A.2d 925 (N.J. 1988)).
289. Child of Indian Heritage, 543 A.2d at 941 (finding that Indian father
was not allowed to assert his rights under the Act because he had not timely
acknowledged his paternity, not because of the misrepresentation of the adoptive parents' attorney).
290. See id.
291. 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507 (Ct. App. 1996).
292. Id.
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tion from being "delayed or prevented."293 However, by the
time the case came to trial the court knew of the father's Indian heritage. 94 In fact, the trial judge believed that the attorney "clearly failed in terms of his responsibility to his clients ....Had he addressed these issues in the initial
interview, we would not all be here today." 9 ' However, the
appellate court refused to apply the Act because the Indian
parents were "assimilated" into white culture and found that
the case was "even weaker where assimilated parents have
previously concluded a reasoned and voluntary relinquishment of a child."29
This is an especially hard case since, although the appellate court refused to find that the attorney's actions materially prejudiced the rights of the Indian parents, the adoptive parents filed suit against the attorney for, inter alia,
fraud, misrepresentation, and concealment.297 Thus, the Act's
lack of any provision for active concealment of a parent's Indian status has also caused inconsistency among the courts.
IV. THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
As the above synthesis of cases shows, most of the problems of inconsistency in applying the Act arise in the context
of voluntary Indian child custody proceedings. This seems to
be because state courts fail to realize that the voluntary acts
of the Indian parents cannot unilaterally determine application of the Act and/or placement of the Indian children, to the
exclusion of the right of the tribe to have a voice in child custody proceedings involving its children.298 As the United
States Supreme Court pointed out in Holyfield, the tribes
have an interest, protected by the ICWA, in "retain [ing
their] children in [their] society." 9 ' Thus, the bill's intent is
293. See id. at 517-18.

294. This case is thus distinct from Child of Indian Heritage, 543 A.2d 925,
in which the court never had any reason to know the child was of Indian heritage.
295. James Rainey, Birth Parents to Get Twins, Judge Rules, L.A. TIMES,
June 15, 1995, at Al (quoting Judge John Henning).
296. Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 526.
297. See Verified Complaint for Damages at 6, Rost v. Cook (Cal. Super. Ct.
L.A. County Aug. 22, 1995) (No. BC 133935).
298. See Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 50
(1989) (citing congressional "concerns going beyond the wishes of the individual
parents").
299. Holyfleld, 490 U.S. at 37 (citation omitted).
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to "preserve the most basic rights of Indian tribes: tribal
self-preservation and self-determination.""'
The ICWA was enacted to protect the tribes' interest in
their children, over and above any interest the tribes may
have had and lost in the children's parents,"0 ' even when
there is a total lack of contact between the children's parents
(who may have assimilated into Anglo culture) and the
tribe.0 2 The Congressional intent behind the ICWA is that
the tribes have the opportunity to establish contact and develop cultural ties with its children.3 3 Therefore, in the case
of an Indian child, not only the parents' right, but also the
tribe's right to stand in loco parentis is protected. °"
In the present bills to amend the ICWA before both
houses of Congress,0 5 this intent is again apparent. The Report accompanying the Senate bill articulates the purpose of
the amendments. The Amendments are intended to make
"the process that applies to voluntary Indian child custody
and adoption proceedings more fair, consistent and certain,
in order to further advance the best interests of Indian children without eroding tribal sovereignty."3 6
While the
Amendments represent Congress' determination to "enhance
the best interests of Indian children by guaranteeing speed,
certainty, and stability in the adoption process," the provisions of the bills also "preserve fundamental principles of
tribal governments by recognizing the appropriate role of

300. 143 CONG. REC. S3122 (daily ed. Apr. 14, 1997) (statement of Sen. Ben
Nighthorse Campbell (R-Col.), Chair of Senate Committee on Indian Affairs).
301. See JOHN MCCAIN, SENATE COMM. ON INDIAN AFFAIRS, H.R. REP. NO.
104-335 (1996) (report to accompany S. 1962, 104th Cong. (1996) (reintroduced
as S. 569 in the 105th Congress)) (hereinafter REPORT]. The Senate Committee
on Indian Affairs emphasized that "[off reservation children and parents, some
of whom may be ... alienated from their tribal community, are a uniquely vulnerable segment of the American Indian and Alaska Native population and the
ICWA specifically recognizes the tribal interest in such individuals." Id. at 20;
see also Metteer, supra note 14, at 673.
302. See In re Interest of Armell, 550 N.E.2d 1060, 1069 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)
(citing Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 30).
303. See Metteer, supra, note 14 at 682.
304. See id; see also REPORT, supra note 301, at 20 ("[Tlhe Committee wishes
to emphasize that an Indian tribe has a parens patriae relationship with all
children who are members or who are eligible for membership and who are
children of tribal members.").
305. S. 569 105th Cong. (1997) and H.R. 1082, 105th Cong. (1997)
[hereinafter the Amendment(s) or the Bill(s)]. The text of these amendments
are identical, as such, they will be referred to jointly in this article.
306. REPORT, supra note 301, at 7.
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these governments in the lives of Indian children."" 7 This is
because the congressional intent underlying the ICWA is a
"recognition by all parties that an Indian child has a vital interest in retaining a connection with his or her Indian
tribe."3 8 However, after nearly twenty years of inconsistent
application of the Act in voluntary Indian child custody proceedings, the hard cases detailed above have lead Congress
"to address the problems of implementing ICWA in voluntary
adoption proceedings. "3 9
In order to accomplish the "speed, certainty, and stability"310 necessary to avoid the hard cases involving "lengthy,

protracted litigation causing great anguish for the [Indian]
children, their adoptive families, their birth families, and
their Indian tribes," " ' the Amendments establish procedures
to insure congressional intent that the tribes receive "early
notice and information ...[in a proceeding] seeking to place

an Indian child in an adoptive situation or otherwise terminate parental rights."31 Thus, the first important change to
be made in application of the ICWA is to unequivocally establish that tribes "shall" receive "written notice of the
placement or proceeding" in all Indian child custody proceedings, including "voluntary placement of an Indian child
or the voluntary termination of the parental rights of an Indian child." 13 This clarification should resolve state courts'

uncertainty and subsequent inconsistency in applying the
Act to voluntary proceedings. 3" The Amendments then specify precise time frames for providing notice to the tribes in
order to guarantee that the Act apply at the inception of the
child custody proceeding.1 '
307. FEDERAL DOCUMENT CLEARING HOUSE, MCCAIN BACKS MEASURE TO

(1997) (government
press release quoting Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.)) available in WESTIAW,
1997 WL 4431597.
308. 143 CONG. REC. S3120 (daily ed. Apr. 14, 1997) (statement of Sen. John
McCain, sponsor of S.569).
309. Id. (statement of Sen. McCain).
310. Id. (statement of Sen. Campbell).
311. Id. (statement of Sen. McCain).
312. Id. (summarizing S.569); see also REPORT, supra note 301, at 19. This
amendment is appended to 25 U.S.C. § 1913(a) (1994). 25 U.S.C. § 1913 is entitled, "Parental rights; voluntary termination;" and subsection (a) is entitled,
"consent; record; certification matters, invalid consent."
313. Amendments, supra note 305, § 6.
314. See supra notes 255-59 and accompanying text.
315. Not later than: 100 days after any foster care placement, 5 days after
OVERHAUL INDIAN CHILD CUSTODY ADOPTION PROCEDURE
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Additionally, section 6 of the Amendments determines
that notice to the tribes is required even after the applicable
periods have expired if a party "discovers that the child may
be an Indian child."" 6 This provision should effectively resolve the problems courts have had in determining whether
notice is necessary when a child's Indian heritage has not
been positively determined." '
Finally, section 7 of the
Amendments provides that the notice to the tribes "shall contain" specific, detailed information about the proceeding. 8'
This would seem to reinforce Congress' intent that the content of the notice is as important as the notice itself, and argue for strict compliance with the notice requirements. 19
The Amendments also provide new requirements regarding tribal intervention, and, in exchange for early and
detailed notice to the tribes, set limitations on when and how
a tribe may intervene. In the context of voluntary adoptions
(25 U.S.C. § 1913) the Amendments add new subsections
which grant tribal intervention in voluntary adoption proceedings, although limiting the time the tribe has to intervene. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c) provides tribal intervention "at any
point,"2 ° in only "foster care placement of, or termination of
parental rights to" an Indian child, remaining silent about
adoptive proceedings."' Because of the inconsistent interpretation by state courts about whether or not adoptive proceedings are specifically excluded, 2 ' the Amendments propose limited intervention in both voluntary proceedings to
terminate parental rights and voluntary adoption proceedings."3 ' In a voluntary adoption proceeding, the tribe's right
to intervene must be filed not later than the later of ninety
days after receiving notice of the adoptive placement, or
thirty days after receiving notice of the voluntary adoptive
proceeding. 24
any preadoptive or adoptive placement, 10 days after commencement of any
proceeding to a termination of parental rights, and 10 days after the commencement of any adoption proceeding.
Amendments, supra note
305, § 6(2)(A).
316. Amendments, supra note 305, § 6. If such a discovery is made, the
party shall provide notice "not later than 10 days after discovery." Id.
317. See supra notes 246-54 and accompanying text.
318. See Amendments, supra note 305, § 7 (amending 25 U.S.C.§ 1913(d)).
319. See supra notes 233-45 and accompanying text.
320. 25 U.S.C § 1911(c) (1994).
321. Id.
322. See supra notes 216-27 and accompanying text.
323. Amendments, supra note 305, § 8 (e)(1)(A)-(B).
324. Id.

1998]

INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT

465

Section 8 of the Amendments also effectively ties the notice requirements to the intervention requirements, since the
tribes' right to intervene is meaningless if they have not received timely notice." 5 The Amendments provide that despite the new limitations on tribal intervention, the child's
tribe retains the right to intervene "at any time" in a voluntary custody proceeding in which the tribe "did not receive
written notification" in accordance the notice requirements.32
Furthermore, "no proceeding for a voluntary termination
of parental rights or adoption of an Indian child may be conducted under applicable State law before the date that is 30
days after the Indian child's tribe receives notice of that proceeding... .327

Congress has found that the tribes have a

substantial interest in having the provisions of the Act328 applied in adoption proceedings as well as foster care proceedings rather than deferring to state law. This Amendment
therefore seeks to protect those interests by guaranteeing the
tribes early notice and a chance to intervene at the beginning
of an Indian child custody proceeding.
Finally, in order to guarantee that the state courts do not
determine a tribe's interest by determining tribal membership or eligibility for membership,2 9 the Amendments provide
that when a tribe files a motion to intervene in a state court
proceeding, the tribe shall submit to the court "a certification
that includes a statement that documents, with respect to
the Indian child involved, the membership or eligibility for
membership of that Indian child in the Indian tribe under
applicable tribal law."3 This Amendment would effectively
325. See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
326. Amendments, supra note 305, § 8 (amending 25 U.S.C. § 1913 by adding
this as new subsection (2)(A)).
327. Amendments, supra note 305, § 8 (amending 25 U.S.C. § 1913 by adding
this as new subsection (g)).
328. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
329. In presenting Senate Bill 569 to the 105th Congress, Senator Ben
Nighthorse Campbell stated that "[tihe right of any sovereign nation, including
Indian nations, includes the right to determine who is and who is not a member
citizen." 143 CONG. REC. S3122 (daily ed. Apr. 14, 1997) (statement of Sen. Ben
Nighthorse Campbell).
330. Amendments, supra note 305, § 8(2)(B); see supra note 212-214 and accompanying text for problems with state courts determining tribal membership
and eligibility in allowing intervention; see also supra Part III.B.1 (discussing
problems with state courts' various definitions of "Indian" for purposes of applying the Act, as they arise when state courts take it upon themselves to determine tribal membership).
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codify Congress' intent, as expressed in the Report accompanying the bill, that
[in recognition of long-standing and fundamental principles of Federal Indian law... tribal determinations of
membership under tribal law are conclusive for the purpose of determining whether a child is an Indian child
subject to the ICWA .... Indian tribes will follow a specified set of rules based upon their own membership requirements which they have established under tribal
law.33'
In addition to limiting the tribes' right to intervene in
voluntary adoptions, the Amendments also set new limitations on when an Indian parent may withdraw consent to
adoption or termination of parental rights. State courts have
strongly reacted against the seemingly open-ended right of
an Indian parent to withdraw consent to the termination of
parental rights as well as consent to foster care and adoptive
placements. 3 2' 25 U.S.C. § 1913(b)-(c) allow parents to withdraw consent "at any time,"3 which, as state courts have determined, forces adoptive or foster care parents to "assume
the risk" that an Indian parent might change his or her mind
at any time in the proceeding before a final decree is entered.534 This has often caused courts to refuse to apply the
33
Act.
Section 5 of the Amendments therefore adds to 25
U.S.C. § 1913(b) a provision that "a consent to adoption of an
Indian child or termination of parental rights to an Indian
child may be revoked only if (A) no final decree of adoption
has been entered; and (B) the adoptive placement specified
by the parent terminates." 13 Additionally, the revocation
must occur before the later of the end of the 180-day period
beginning on the date the tribe receives notice of the proceeding or the thirty day period beginning on the date on
which the parent who revokes consent receives notice of an
adoption proceeding which includes an explanation of the
revocation period.3 7 Setting such limits will insure that the
331.
332.
333.
334.

REPORT, supra note 301, at 16.
See supra notes 265-67 and accompanying text.
25 U.S.C. § 1913(b)-(c) (1994).
See supra note 266 and accompanying text; see also supra note 265 and

accompanying text.
335. See supra notes 269-72 and 278-82 and accompanying text.
336. Amendments, supra note 305, § 5(2)(A)(B)(i)(ii).
337. Id.
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hard cases, in which children who have bonded with new
parents are removed from placements after many months or
even years have gone by, are not repeated.33
However, along with the time limits set on withdrawal of
parental consent, the Amendments clarify the existing provisions of the ICWA that specify the validation of consent before a judge and further require a judge to "certify that the
birth parents have been informed of their placement options
and of their rights under the ICWA." 3 ' The intent behind
this additional information is to "increase the opportunity for
birth parents to fully consider their placement options at the
very beginning of the procedure and more fully understand
their right[s]."' In turn, providing the Indian parent with
this information at the outset "should help lessen the number
of disputes which can arise later on in the process because
parents were unclear about their available options when they
placed the child for adoption."3"
In addition, section 5 of the Amendments provides that
when an Indian parent makes a timely revocation under section 5, paragraph (2) of the Amendments, described above,
the Indian child "shall be returned to the parent who revokes
consent immediately."34 This provision seems to show Congress' intent that a state court may not refuse to return an
Indian child to his or her parents upon proper parental revocation of consent under the Act, based on a finding that a return to the Indian parent is not in the child's "best interests." 3 Therefore, contrary to the court's reasoning in In re
Bridget R., that "the reach of section 1913 is limited by the
[Indian child's] interest in having a stable and secure
338. See In re Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action No. S-903, 635 P.2d
187, 191 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981) (consent revoked six months after given, but before final decree of adoption); In re Adoption of KL.R.F., 515 A.2d 33, 38 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1986) (consent revoked one year after given, but before final decree
of adoption). This provision works in tandem with the early notice to the tribe
provision of the Amendments to insure that the opposite does not occur either:
that adoptive parents are rewarded because they have been able to keep the
child through "protracted litigation," during which time they have bonded with
the child, such that neither state nor tribal courts will remove the child and
place him/her according to the Act's placement preferences. See Mississippi
Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 54 (1989).
339. REPORT, supra note 301, at 17.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Amendments, supra note 305, § 5(3).
343. See supra notes 274-84 and accompanying text.
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home,"s " the Amendments would limit the time in which an

Indian parent may revoke consent, but not the reach of 25
U.S.C. § 1913. When a parent has complied with the revocation requirements, the Amendment would preclude a state
court from determining that it is not in the Indian child's
best interests to be returned to the Indian parents. This provision shows a recognition of the fundamental assumption
that it is in the Indian child's best interest that its cultural
ties be protected.4 5
Section 5 also responds to the "hard case" presented in In
re Bridget R. by including a paragraph specifying that when
a court of competent jurisdiction finds that the Indian parent's consent to adoption or voluntary termination of parental rights was obtained by "fraud or duress," consent may be
revoked beyond the newly imposed time limits set out in
paragraph (2) of the Amendments. 346 However, in keeping
with Congress' other stated intent, "to guarantee ...speed

[and] certainty... in the adoption process,"347 section 5 lastly
provides that "no adoption that has been in effect for a period
of longer than or equal to 2 years may be invalidated under
this subsection."348 However, the Amendments would add to
the ICWA a provision for criminal sanctions against "a person, other than a birth parent of the child" upon conviction, if
such person "knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals," or
misrepresents the status of an Indian parent or child.349
V. CONCLUSION

These Amendments, along with a provision for open
adoptions and enforceable visitation rights, even when such
rights do not exist in state law,35° constitute the highlights of
344. In re Bridget R, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507, 533 (Ct. App. 1996).
345. See REPORT, supra note 301, at 11 (quoting Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 50 (1989)).
346. See Amendments, supra note 305, § 5(3)(B). The Amendments are
clearly a response to many "high profile" hard cases, but specifically to Bridget
R. Senator McCain has written that the case of "a non-Indian Ohio couple, Jim
and Colette Rost, who have been trying to adopt twin daughters-now nearly 3
years old-placed with them at birth by an adoption attorney who failed to disclose that the children were Indians" led to the compromise bill Senate Bill
1962 introduced to the 104th Congress (reintroduced as Senate Bill 569 in the
105th Congress). John McCain, Amity in Indian Adoptions, WASH. POST, Aug.
2, 1996, at A21.
347. FEDERAL DOCUMENT CLEARING HOUSE, supra note 307.
348. Amendments, supra note 305, at § 5(6).
349. Id., section 114; see also supra notes 285-97 and accompanying text.
350. Amendments, supra note 305, at § 8(3)(h)(i).
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the bills presently before both houses of Congress.35' If enacted, they will go a long way in remedying many of the
abuses of the ICWA by state courts over the last two decades.
However, two large areas of concern remain if the ICWA is to
be consistently applied: a determination of whether the existing Indian family exception is a valid exception to applying
the Act, and a definition or deletion of "good cause" in both
the jurisdictional provisions of 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) and the
placement preferences of 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a).
First, any Amendments to the Act must contain a specific statement of Congressional intent that the Act applies to
all children who are members of a tribe or eligible for membership as the child of a member. Implicit within this requirement is the requirement that the tribes' determination
of their membership is necessary and conclusive. The Report
accompanying the Senate bill to Amend the ICWA states that
the existing Indian family exception
is completely contrary to the entire purpose of the
ICWA ....
Indian tribes have the authority to define their
membership ....The ICWA, as amended, is to be applied

to all Indian children regardless of their individual circumstances ....[T]he adoption of [the Amendments of

S.569] should be construed as a rejection of "existing Indian family exception doctrine" in all its manifestations.5 2
However, this statement of Congressional intent must be
incorporated into the Act to avoid further judicial
interpretation of what Congress really did intend, in the Act
itself.
The courts have a history of interpreting the Act to their
own purposes in areas in which Congressional intent is not
strictly spelled out. The existing Indian family exception was
judicially created although "[t]he language of the Act contains no such exception to its applicability,"353 and despite the
351. Amendments, supra note 305.
352. REPORT, supra note 301, at 14.
353. In re Junious L, 193 Cal. Rptr. 40, 46 (Ct. App. 1983); see also, In re
N.S., 474 N.W.2d 96 (S.D. 1991). "There is simply no statutory requirement for
[the child] to have been born into an Indian home or community in order to
come within the provisions of the ICWA, however much one might believe 25
U.S.C. § 1903(4) should have been written that way."
Id. at 101
n.(unnumbered) (Sabers, J., concurring) (emphasis in original)); In re Adoption
of S.S., 657 N.E.2d 935, 953 (111. 1995) (McMorrow, J., dissenting) ("There is no
provision in the ICWA that an Indian child be born into or be living in an Indian family unit to be subject to its provisions. However much one might be-
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fact that legislation affecting Indian relations is the exclusive
province of federal law.5 Additionally, the courts created
the exception and have continued to apply it although Congress considered and rejected proposed language which
would have so restricted the application of the ICWA. 5
Furthermore, the exception has persisted despite the
Supreme Court's holding that the Act applied even to twins
who had been placed with a non-Indian family at birth and
had never been on the reservation or spent time with their
Indian family. 56 The Supreme Court reasoned that
[t]ribal jurisdiction under § 1911(a) was not meant to be
defeated by the actions of individual members of the tribe,
for Congress was concerned, not solely about the interests
of Indian children and families, but also about the impact
on the tribes themselves of the large numbers of Indian
children adopted by non-Indians. 57
Although the Supreme Court's opinion would seem to
make it clear that the Act is not limited to children taken
from an existing Indian family, and that "Indian tribes still
ha[ve] a legitimate interest in the welfare of members who
[do] not have previous significant contact with the tribe or
the reservation," 58 state courts have still applied the exception. Therefore, despite the statement of the intent behind
the 1997 Amendments included in the accompanying Report,
that intent must be somewhere incorporated into the text of
the Act in order to insure that state courts do not apply the
existing Indian family exception.
Second, the Amendments must either specifically define
or else delete the "good cause to the contrary" language from
both 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) and 25 U.S.C. § 1915. This vague
lieve the ICWA should have been written that way, 'no amount of probing into
what Congress "intended" can alter what Congress said.'" (citation omitted)).
354. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
355. See Nelson v. Hunter, 888 P.2d 124, 126 n.4 (Or. App. Ct. 1995) (citing 6
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7538-39, 7558-63 (1978) (Congress rejected language in
ICWA that would restrict application of the Act to enrolled members of the
tribe)); see also In re Adoption of S.S., 657 N.E.2d at 951 (Congress rejected
proposal that Indian child have "significant contacts" with the tribe in order to
invoke tribal jurisdiction under the ICWA); In re Guardianship of Ashley Elizabeth R., 863 P.2d 451, 454 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993) (lack of contact with tribe rejected in BIA Guidelines as "good cause not to transfer" proceedings to tribe).
356. See Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 53
(1989).
357. Id. at 49.
358. Yavapai-Apache Tribe v. Mejia, 906 S.W.2d 152, 171 (Tex. App. Ct.
1995).
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language has allowed state courts to inconsistently determine both tribal jurisdiction to determine the placement of
Indian children and then make the ultimate placement decision according to the courts' own view of what is best for an
Indian child. While one practitioner has suggested that Congress provide a "specific list of what does and does not constitute 'good cause to the contrary,' she is also the first to point
out that such a list "would, of course, not be exhaustive."35 9
However, a non-exhaustive list of good causes would allow
the courts much the same latitude they have now in determining good causes."' Rather than interpreting what Congress intended good cause to be, they would simply interpret
which good causes beyond those on the list Congress intended to be included.
Therefore, others have suggested that, rather than including a partial list of what is good cause not to follow the
mandates of 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) or 25 U.S.C. § 1915, the
Amendments might list the "limited circumstances in which
the state may retain jurisdiction" or determine placement
contrary to 25 U.S.C. § 1915.61 However, since the state
courts have broadly construed the good cause exceptions to
retain jurisdiction and make placements, there is every reason to believe they would also broadly construe any circumstances which specifically detailed Congress' grant of jurisdiction and/or the power to determine placement of Indian
children to the state courts.
Accordingly, the "good cause" exceptions to 25
U.S.C. § 1911(b) and 25 U.S.C. § 1915 should be deleted to
take away any possibility that the state courts will variously
define the term and make exceptions to provisions regarding
tribal jurisdiction and the placement of Indian children
which are the heart of the ICWA. This proposal is supported
by the United States Supreme Court's pronouncement in Holyfield that the Act, as a "federal statute," was intended to
have "uniform nationwide
application" achieved by
"nationwide uniformity" in statutory definitions,"' as well as
359. Bakeis, supra note 11, at 586.
360. See supra notes 144-202 and accompanying text.
361. Patrice Kunesh-Hartman, Comment, The Indian Child Welfare Act of
1978: ProtectingEssential Tribal Interests, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 131, 166 (1989)
(emphasis in original).
362. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 44-45
(1989).
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Congress' admonition, codified in 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5), that
"the States... have often failed to recognize essential tribal
relations of Indian people, and the cultural and social standards prevailing in Indian communities and families." 6 '
At the time of this writing, the Amendments before both
houses of Congress seem destined to pass into law. This is
needed legislation, which should make the ICWA a viable vehicle for protecting the interests of not only Indian children
and parents, but also of the tribes themselves. The tribal
compromises'" limiting the time for tribal intervention and
an Indian parent's revocation of consent under the Act also
insure that adoptive parents can enter into the adoption of
Indian children in the limited circumstances provided for in
the Act with new confidence that such adoptions will be
"certain, stab[le], and final[ I."'65 However, in order to insure
that the "hard cases" that have made bad law for nearly two
decades do not continue, the Amendments may need even
further revision so that state courts do not continue to find
exceptions to the Act's application. But there is reason to
hope that the ICWA will continue to protect an Indian child's
"best interest that its relationship to the tribe be protected."3"'

363. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5) (1994).
364. See REPORT, supra note 301, at 11-12.
365. 143 CONG. REC. S3122 (Apr. 14, 1997) (statement of Sen. Ben
Nighthorse Campbell).
366. See Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 50 n.24.

